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 1  Inigo Montoya, THE PRINCESS BRIDE (Act III Communications, Buttercup Films, the Princess 
Bride Ltd. 1987). (The villain Vizzini repeatedly proclaims events “Inconceivable!” - they 
occur anyway.). 
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INTRODUCTION 
The expression “Medicare for All” (“M4A”) was on repeat as 
presidential primary candidates discussed health reform, yet few 
using this language appeared to understand precisely what Medicare 
is, how it works, or which aspects of health care could be affected by 
such a law. In fact, the plans presented in the many bills before the 
116th Congress generally do not implicate Medicare as it currently 
exists but appear to draw on the magic of the word “Medicare” to 
capture the public’s desire for health reform.2 Even before the novel 
coronavirus pandemic, polls showed health care at the top of public 
concerns for the 2020 election3 and indicated that voters of all political 
 
 2   Ryan Struyk & Grace Sparks, Health care is the top issue for Iowa caucus goers, entrance polls 





 3  Pew Research Center, Public’s policy priorities for 2019, PEW (Feb. 4, 2019),  
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/02/04/state-of-the-union-2019-how-americans-
see-major-national-issues/pp_2019-01-24_political-priorities_0-02/; KFF, Poll: Strong Initial 
Support for a Public Option, But Arguments Can Significantly Shift Views, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 
(July 30, 2019), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/press-release/poll-strong-initial-support-
for-a-public-option-but-arguments-can-significantly-shift-views/. 
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stripes are both interested in health reform and expect government to 
be involved, especially lower income individuals.4 But, when asked 
about the desirability of government-sponsored universal health 
insurance coverage, answers very much have depended on the 
phrasing of the questions,5 highlighting enduring confusion about 
health care in the United States.6  
It is striking that Americans are debating major health reform 
when the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) – 
President Obama’s signature legislation and a health reform effort on 
a scale not seen in decades –just turned ten years old. The ACA 
changed the American baseline principle from exclusion to inclusion – 
as I have called it elsewhere, a principle of universality – and 
effectively kick-started a conversation about health care expectations, 
which now appear to include universal coverage.7 But, the ACA also 
ratcheted up health care complexity by expanding disparate features 
of private and public insurance, exacerbated by the crazy quilt of 
 
 4  Samantha Smith, Many lower-income Republicans see ensuring health coverage for all as a 
government responsibility, PEW (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/03/23/many-lower-income-republicans-see-ensuring-health-coverage-for-all-as-a-
government-responsibility/ (“Lower-income Republicans are both more likely to say they 
approve of the Affordable Care Act and to say the government is responsible for ensuring 
health care coverage than higher-income Republicans. Three-in-ten of those with family 
incomes of $30,000 or less say they approve of the law, and about half (52%) say the 
government has a responsibility to ensure health care coverage. This compares with just 11% 
of Republicans with household incomes of $75,000 or more who approve of the law, and 18% 
of this same group who say the government has a responsibility to ensure that all Americans 
have health care coverage.”); Jocelyn Kiley & Pew Research Center, Most continue to say 
ensuring health care coverage is government’s responsibility, PEW (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/03/most-continue-to-say-ensuring-health-
care-coverage-is-governments-responsibility/. 
 5   Public Opinion on Single-Payer, National Health Plans, and Expanding Access to Medicare 
Coverage, KAISER FAM. FOUND  (Apr. 03, 2019), https://www.kff.org/slideshow/public-
opinion-on-single-payer-national-health-plans-and-expanding-access-to-medicare-
coverage/. 
 6  Drew Altman, Voters are tuning out the health care debates, AXIOS (June 3, 2019), 
https://www.axios.com/voters-are-tuning-out-the-health-care-debates-a3056cab-6ab2-4f5e-
9ee4-113fa038ae72.html (focus groups indicated voters have not heard of Medicare for All 
and related proposals but are concerned about paying medical bills and “navigating” health 
care). 
 7  Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica Roberts, Health Care and the Myth of Self-Reliance, 57 B.C. L. REV. 
1, 3 (2016); Nicole Huberfeld, The Universality of Medicaid at Fifty, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. 
& ETHICS 67 (2015). 
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implementation that has occurred in the wake of four trips to the U.S. 
Supreme Court in less than nine years (soon to be five).8  
Somewhat paradoxically, while the ACA pioneered universal 
health insurance coverage, it did so by building new scaffolding 
around an old foundation.9 The ACA regulates various aspects of 
private and public insurance to craft universal coverage. For example, 
it cultivates state-based individual health insurance markets (weak 
markets when the law was enacted); regulates health insurance 
practices that had excluded subscribers, such as lifetime caps and 
preexisting condition exclusions; builds on existing public programs, 
such as Medicare and expanding eligibility for Medicaid; and uses 
arrangements like employer sponsored health insurance (ESI) to 
preserve existing coverage for the middle and upper class. The ACA’s 
complex regulatory mechanisms did little to alter the fragmented 
health care landscape and may have worsened it by enhancing the 
existing legacy programs, simultaneously improving and 
complicating access to care.10  
Measured by its primary goal of universal insurance coverage, 
studies show that the ACA has been largely successful. The ACA 
sharply decreased uninsurance rates, improved access to care, reduced 
health disparities, decreased financial strain in low-income 
households, and rendered economic benefits for both states and health 
care providers.11 The demand for health reform that arose in 2019 
 
 8  Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, Federalism under the ACA: Implementation, Opposition, 
Entrenchment, in THE TRILLION DOLLAR EXPERIMENT (Emanuel & Gluck, eds. 2020); Nat’l Fed’n 
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); Maine Community Health Options v. United 
States, 590 U.S.  (Apr. 27, 2020). Additionally, the case commonly called Texas v. United States 
will be heard by the Supreme Court in the October 2020 term. See Texas v. United States, No. 
19-10011 (5th Cir. Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.ca5. uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/19/19-10011-
CV0.pdf (declaring individual mandate an unconstitutional exercise of the tax power without 
a penalty and remanding to the district court for complete severability analysis); petition for 
certiorari in California v. Texas granted March 2, 2020, Docket No. 19-840. 
 9  A more fitting term is near-universal because undocumented noncitizens were excluded, and 
other immigrants have a five year waiting period for most programs. See generally Pub. L. No. 
111-148, §1323(f)(3), 124 Stat. 119, 184 (2010). 
 10  For a survey of the health care system’s fragmentation, see generally EINER ELHAUGE, THE 
FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS ( 2010). 
 11  Larisa Antonisse, Rachel Garfield, Robin Rudowitz & Madeline Guth, The Effects of Medicaid 
Expansion under the ACA: Updated Findings from a Literature Review, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 
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could therefore seem puzzling: why did this broad cry for health 
reform exist so soon into the ACA’s implementation? And what does 
the public want?  
The ACA wove universal coverage from already delicate fabric. 
While the law’s implementation was interrupted by NFIB v. Sebelius, I 
posit the law could not have eliminated some of the coverage, access, 
and cost problems of our health care non-system that pre-existed the 
ACA’s enactment. A core set of ideas that underlie most social 
programs but are especially salient in health care – such as equitability 
and administrative simplicity – have proven difficult to address in this 
landscape of legacy programs, entrenched interests, and path 
dependence. Given the ACA that we have (rather than the law that 
was intended), the most important policy question may be whether the 
ACA can and should be improved upon or whether something new is 
the best answer.  
This paper first offers a very brief overview of the ACA and 
suggests that to avoid repetition of this hundred-year battle, lessons 
must be learned from the ACA’s enactment and implementation, 
contextualized by historic weak spots in American health policy. Part 
II surveys the structure and approach of the major federal and state 
health reform bills proposed in 2019-20, placing them on a spectrum of 
disruption relative to the current health care landscape.12 This analysis 
exposes the fact that most of the energy was directed toward filling the 
gaps of the ACA by facilitating a new public insurance product, what 
many call a “public option,” to be sold on the exchanges. This part 
reveals that only one bill calls for a true Medicare for All, if that term 
 
17, 2020), https://www.kff.org/ medicaid/issue-brief/the-effects-of-medicaid-expansion-
under-the-aca-updated-findings-from-a-literature-review-august-2019/; Nicole Huberfeld, 
Rural Health, Universality, and Legislative Targeting, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 241 (2018) (almost 
all rural hospital closures have occurred in Medicaid nonexpansion states over the last 
decade). 
 12  The term “disruptive innovation” describes business breakthroughs that “disrupt” existing 
business markets. This paper does not adopt The Innovator’s Prescription’s use of the term 
“disruption” nor espouse the book’s notion that the market will cure all medical delivery and 
accessibility issues if only innovation is allowed to shake up overly-regulated markets. See 
generally CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, JEROME H. GROSSMAN & JASON HWANG, THE INNOVATOR’S 
PRESCRIPTION: A DISRUPTIVE SOLUTION FOR HEALTH CARE (McGraw Hill ed., 2009) (asserting 
technology will “disrupt” traditional medical care, building on Christensen’s book The 
Innovator’s Dilemma). For a health policy review of The Innovator’s Prescription, see J.D. 
Kleinke, Perfection in Power Point, 28 HEALTH AFFS. 1223 (2009). 
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means a comprehensive, single-payer, government-provided public 
insurance program. The paper then highlights the distance between 
law and policy (and politics) by evaluating constitutional implications 
of the major proposals. Finally, the paper considers whether these 
proposals capture the health reform gestalt, which seems to be a cry 
for simplification, fairness, equitability, and lower costs, i.e., a demand 
for true universal coverage and the protections it affords. This demand 
was intense before the novel coronavirus outbreak, but the urgent 
need for a more equitable and inclusive health care system has been 
thrown into sharp relief by the double disaster of this health and 
economic crisis. 
 
I. Measuring the ACA on Its Own Terms 
The ACA experienced newfound heights of popularity as it 
approached the ten year mark, yet demand for health reform less than 
one decade after the enactment of such major legislation demands 
examination.13 First, consider the ACA’s goals, as enacted. The ACA 
codified a norm of near-universal coverage14 by working to improve 
access to care through health insurance.15 This norm was intended to 
 
 13  Health Tracking Poll: The Public’s Views on the ACA, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 3, 2020), 
https://www.kff.org/interactive/kff-health-tracking-poll-the-publics-views-on-the-
aca/#?response=Favorable Unfavorable&aRange =twoYear. 
 14  Remarks of Vice President Biden at the signing of the ACA: “You have turned, Mr. President, 
the right of every American to have access to decent health care into reality for the first time 
in American history. … a man named Barack Obama put the final girder in the framework 
for a social network in this country to provide the single most important element of what 
people need—and that is access to good health—and that every American from this day 
forward will be treated with simple fairness and basic justice.” Joe Biden, Vice President, 
United States of America, Remarks at the signing of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (Mar. 23, 2010) https://www.obamalibrary.gov/sites/default/files/uploads 
/documents/Signing%20of%20the%20Health%20Insurance%20Reform%20Bill%202010%20
%28TRANSCRIPT%29.pdf. 
 15  President Obama remarks at signing of the ACA: “And we have now just enshrined, as soon 
as I sign this bill, the core principle that everybody should have some basic security when it 
comes to their health care.” Barack Obama, President, United States of America, Remarks at 
the signing of the Affordable Care Act (Mar. 23, 2010) https:// www.obamalibrary.gov 
/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/Signing%20of%20the%20Health%20Insurance%20Re
form%20Bill%202010%20%28TRANSCRIPT%29.pdf. 
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end the century-plus debate about who gets care in the U.S.,16 a goal 
President Obama declared when he addressed Congress in 2009:  
I return to speak to all of you about an issue that is central to that future 
– and that is the issue of health care. I am not the first President to take 
up this cause, but I am determined to be the last. It has now been nearly 
a century since Theodore Roosevelt first called for health care reform. 
And, ever since, nearly every President and Congress, whether 
Democrat or Republican, has attempted to meet this challenge in some 
way. A bill for comprehensive health reform was first introduced by 
John Dingell Sr. in 1943. Sixty-five years later, his son continues to 
introduce that same bill at the beginning of each session.17 
It is true that nearly every president from Theodore Roosevelt 
forward has had to address health policy.18 Instead of ending this long 
debate, the ACA foregrounded a national conversation about 
universal coverage, including whether health care is a right that can be 
actualized within our deeply fragmented system.19 
The ACA addressed a wide variety of issues, but the centerpiece 
was tackling ever increasing uninsurance for low-income households 
and part-time workers with new national standards. Medicaid 
eligibility was expanded by eliminating states’ choice regarding 
 
 16  President Obama remarks at the ACA signing: “I’m signing this bill for all the leaders who 
took up this cause through the generations—from Teddy Roosevelt to Franklin Roosevelt, 
from Harry Truman, to Lyndon Johnson, from Bill and Hillary Clinton, to one of the deans 
who’s been fighting this so long, John Dingell….” Barack Obama, President, United States of 
America, Remarks at the signing of the Affordable Care Act (Mar. 23, 2010) (transcript 
available at the Barack Obama Presidential Library, https://www.obamalibrary.gov/ sites 
/default/files/uploads/documents/Signing%20of%20the%20Health%20Insurance% 
20Reform%20Bill%202010%20%28 TRANSCRIPT %29.pdf. 
 17  Barack Obama, President, United States of America, Obama’s Health Care Speech to 
Congress (Sept. 9, 2009) (transcript available at the N.Y. TIMES,  https://www.nytimes.com 
/2009/09/10/us/politics/10obama.text.html?auth=login-email&login=email. 
 18  Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 
1689, 1713 (2018). 
 19  At least two Democratic candidates call health care a human right. Elizabeth Warren stated 
this during debates and on Twitter. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, (@ewarren), TWITTER (June 26, 
2019), https://twitter.com/ewarren/status/1144054259547299850. Bernie Sanders has stated 
many times that health care is a human right. See, e.g., Bernie Sanders, (@BernieSanders), 
TWITTER (June 27, 2019), https://twitter.com/berniesanders/status /1144423468328542208 
?lang=en; Sen. Bernie Sanders, Health Care Is a Right, Not a Privilege, HEALTHCARE IS A HUMAN 
RIGHT (June 8, 2009, 4:08 PM), http://healthcareisahumanright.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/04/Health_Care_Is_a_Right_Not_a_Privilege_Sen_Bernie_Sanders.pdf. 
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whether to cover the childless adults that had always been beyond 
Medicaid’s historically “deserving” populations (children, pregnant 
women, very poor parents, the disabled, and the elderly).20 Individual 
and small group insurance markets were created through new health 
insurance exchanges, meant to be run by the states with federal start-
up money. The ACA also introduced rules for private health 
insurance, such as quality and patient protections, affordability 
standards, basic benefits, barring caps, ending price discrimination 
based on health status, and preventing coverage exclusions based on 
preexisting conditions. The Court’s decision in NFIB v. Sebelius 
infamously upheld the requirement to purchase insurance as an 
exercise of the tax power but allowed states to opt out of Medicaid 
expansion as an overreach of the spending power (discussed further 
in Part III).21 Effectively, NFIB took the Medicaid expansion’s national 
baseline and pushed it back to the states. This had a spillover effect on 
the exchanges, which states pushed back to the federal government as 
a form of political protest against the ACA.22  
Studies show the ACA has delivered on its design where states 
support implementation rather than thwart it.23 The ACA achieved 
high rates of insurance coverage (more than 91%) despite states 
concentrated in the South and central Midwest resisting expansion.24 
More than 400 studies have linked Medicaid expansion with 
numerous health and other benefits.25 For example, Medicaid 
 
 20  The question of who deserves the support of social programs has long been tied to categories 
of deserving versus undeserving poor and questions of who is malingering. See, e.g., Nicole 
Huberfeld, Federalism in Health Care Reform, in HOLES IN THE SAFETY NET: FEDERALISM AND 
POVERTY 197, 199-204 (Ezra Rosser, ed. 2019) (exposing the history of the term “able bodied.”). 
 21  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 22  See generally Gluck & Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?, supra note 18. Bizarre 
because states invited more federal power into their “sovereign” borders when they refused 
to create their own exchanges. 
 23  Gluck & Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?, supra note 18. 
 24  CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., REP. NO. P60-267(RV), HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN 
THE UNITED STATES: 2018 (2019), https://www.census.gov/library /publications 
/2019/demo/p60-267.html); Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions: Interactive Map, KAISER 
FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.kff. org /Medicaid/issue-brief/status-of-state-
medicaid-expansion-decisions-interactive-map/.  
 25  Madeline Guth et al., The Effects of Medicaid Expansion under the ACA: Updated Findings from a 
Literature Review, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.kff.org/medicai 
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expansion has been shown to increase coverage for both expansion 
and nonexpansion populations.26 The increases in coverage have 
moved the needle on health disparities by improving coverage and 
access for historically vulnerable populations such as Black and ethnic 
minorities, people with low educational attainment, and low-income 
people. But, states like Indiana that implemented expansion waivers 
with limitations, such as imposing premiums, have created barriers to 
enrollment that decreased possible coverage and access to care for 
those who could enroll.27 Reports show immediate disenrollment 
effects due to work requirements in expansion demonstration waivers. 
For example, in 2018, more than 18,000 people were disenrolled in 
Arkansas within three months, and no increase in employment 
occurred.28  
Expansion state populations also evince improvements in 
underlying determinants of health, such as education, housing, food, 
transportation, income, and other factors.29 For example, studies report 
that Medicaid expansion facilitates beneficiary financial stability, 
improving job stability, decreasing medical debt, and reducing use of 
high-interest payday loans.30 One study found that expansion 




 26  See id. at 2-3. 




 28  Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Medicaid Work Requirements — Results from the First Year in 
Arkansas, 381 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1017 (2019), https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056 
/NEJMsr1901772 ?articleTools=true. 
 29  Kevin Griffith et al., The Affordable Care Act Reduced Socioeconomic Disparities in Health Care 
Access, 36 HEALTH AFFS. 1503 (2017).  
 30  Naomi Zewde & Christopher Wimer, Antipoverty Impact of Medicaid Growing with State 
Expansions over Time, 38 HEALTH AFFS. 132 (2019); Luojia Hu et al., The Effect of the Affordable 
Care Act Medicaid Expansions on Financial Wellbeing, 163 J. PUB. ECON. 99 (2018); Renuka 
Tipirneni et al., Association of Medicaid Expansion With Enrollee Employment and Student Status 
in Michigan, JAMA NETWORK OPEN, Jan. 2020, at 1, https://jamanetwork .com/journals 
/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2759843.   
 31  Heidi L. Allen et al., Can Medicaid Expansion Prevent Housing Evictions?, 38 HEALTH AFFS. 1451 
(2019). 
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Medicaid expansion increases voter registration and participation in 
elections (and that disenrollment decreases voting).32  
Providers in expansion states report improved financial stability, 
with fewer uninsured visits and corresponding declines in 
uncompensated care. This financial benefit has been significant in 
rural areas and in states that had high rates of uninsurance pre-ACA. 
Since 2010, more than 100 rural hospitals have closed but almost none 
are located in expansion states.33 In addition, expansion states display 
financial benefits such as budget neutrality (or savings) and economic 
growth.34 Furthermore, expansion states have decreased costs in some 
adjacent areas such as criminal justice, disability benefits, and 
behavioral health spending, in part because federal funds replaced 
state dollars but also in part because social determinants of health 
improved.35 Also, studies link lower exchange premiums to Medicaid 
expansion.36 
Some states have resisted implementing Medicaid expansion and 
the ACA writ large, and they have impeded information and policy 
diffusion, making it harder for their residents to understand and 
participate in events like open enrollment. As a result, nearly half of 
the nation’s remaining uninsured are eligible for subsidies to purchase 
private insurance on the exchanges.37 A “coverage gap” exists in 
 
 32  Jake Haselswerdt & Jamila Michener, Disenrolled: Retrenchment and Voting in Health Policy, 44 
J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 423, 426 (2019) (summarizing studies that indicate Medicaid and 
Medicaid expansion increase voting); see also Margot Sanger-Katz, When Medicaid Expands, 
More People Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2018; Jake Haselwerdt, Expanding Medicaid, Expanding 
the Electorate: The Affordable Care Act’s Short-Term Impact on Political Participation, 42 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 667 (2017). 
 33  See generally Nicole Huberfeld, Rural Health, Universality, and Legislative Targeting, 13 HARV. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 241 (2018) (documenting and exploring rural health disparities and the link 
between Medicaid expansion and hospital department or total closures). 
 34  Guth, supra note 25, at 9–10. 
 35  Id. 
 36  Aditi P. Sen & Thomas DeLeire, The Effect of Medicaid expansion on Marketplace Premiums, 
ASPE ISSUE BRIEF (Sept. 6, 2016), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/206761/Mcaid 
ExpMktplPrem.pdf. 
 37  Jennifer Tolbert et al., Key Facts about the Uninsured Population, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 13, 
2019), https://www.kff.org/uninsured/issue-brief/key-facts-about-the-uninsuredpopula 
tion/. 
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nonexpansion states, leaving uninsured at least two million people 
who are eligible for Medicaid under the ACA.38  
Additionally, some sit near to, yet outside of, the ACA’s regime. 
For these groups, private health insurance – ESI or otherwise – remains 
prohibitively expensive, even though they earn close to the American 
median income.39 Individuals in this “near to” population include 
people covered by ESI who are low to middle income and must pay 
higher proportions of their earnings, which undercuts the financial 
protection insurance is meant to provide.40 Some earn slightly more 
than 400% of the federal poverty level (FPL),41 a group who are 
ineligible for tax subsidies to purchase insurance on exchanges and 
that experienced increased uninsurance from 2015-17.42 Others are 
covered as the ACA intended but find that actuarially valid insurance 
is too expensive for their household income, or that they are under-
insured.43 Still others live in states with Medicaid demonstration 
 
 38  Rachel Garfield et al., The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults States that Do Not Expand 
Medicaid, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-
coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-do-not-expand-medicaid/. 
 39  CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T  OF COM., RELEASE No. CB19-141, INCOME, POVERTY AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2018 (2019), https://www.census.gov 
/newsroom/press-releases/2019/income-poverty.html (2018 median income was $63,179); 
Drew Altman, Health Care Costs as Much as a New Car, AXIOS (Aug. 28, 2019), 
https://www.axios.com/health-care-costs-insurance-premiums-deductibles -car-580fa6c8-
0dd2-427b-8dda-c898d568e51e.html (reporting employer sponsored health insurance for a 
family of four costs as much as a VW Bug, but calling coverage “health care”). 
 40  Gary Claxton et al., How affordability of health care varies by income among people with employer 
coverage, PETERSON-KAISER HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.health 
systemtracker.org/brief/how-affordability-of-health-care-varies-by-income-among-people-
with-employer-coverage/ (“lower income families spend a greater share of their income on 
health costs than those with higher incomes, and … health status of family members is 
associated with higher out-of-pocket expenses.”). 
 41  OFF. OF ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 2019 
POVERTY GUIDELINES (2019), https://aspe.hhs.gov/2019-poverty-guidelines. (The poverty 
guidelines are updated in the Federal Register by the authority granted under 42 U.S.C. 
9902(2). In 2019, the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) was $12,490 for one person, with $4,420 for 
each additional person.)  
 42  LINDA J. BLUMBERG ET AL., CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REMAINING UNINSURED: AN UPDATE 6 
(2018), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98764/2001914character istics-
of-the-remaining-uninsured-an-update_2.pdf.  
 43  Steven Findlay, Health Insurance Costs Crushing Many People Who Don’t Get Federal Subsidies, 
AP NEWS (Dec. 14, 2018), https://apnews.com/9050e471ba4543998f5c075b14047dc4; Abby 
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waivers that complicate eligibility, enrollment, and benefits, which 
pushes thousands out where the law intended them to be inside the 
system.44 
For years, the story has been that political resistance to the ACA 
undermined implementation, especially where states were supposed 
to take up the mantel.  Polls showed public uncertainty about the law’s 
existence, not to mention its goals and their realization.45 Congress’s 
“repeal and replace” efforts after President Trump’s election reflected 
a sense that the ACA suffered from a lack of bipartisan support in its 
passage and that Republicans should try to repeal and replace a law 
perceived by some to be unpopular. Yet, grassroots support for the 
ACA emerged at the same time, evidenced by on-the-ground 
democratic action like state ballot initiatives to expand Medicaid.46 
This new story indicates despite the fracas, or maybe because of it, the 
ACA appears to have generated a durable expectation of universal 
coverage. This confronts the state politicians that have chosen to sit 
outside the ACA’s reforms, such as Medicaid expansion. But, the 
current call for health reform also may indicate that flaws would have 
materialized even if implementation of the ACA were not disrupted 
by NFIB.  
 
Goodnough, Obamacare Premiums to Fall and Number of Insurers to Rise Next Year, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/22/us/politics/obamacare-trump .html. 
 44  For example, Kentucky, Indiana, Arkansas, New Hampshire and other states obtained 
Section 1115 demonstration waivers that complicate enrollment for the newly eligible by 
implementing work requirements, cost sharing, and other barriers to enrollment and access 
to care. See Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Approved and Pending Section 1115 Waivers by State, KAISER 
FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-waiver-
tracker-approved-and-pending-section-1115-waivers-by-state/. These efforts were halted by 
federal courts and appeals are pending. See Gresham v. Azar, Nos. 19-5094 & 19-5096 (D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals Feb. 14, 2020); Philbrick v. Azar, No. 19-773 (D.D.C. Jul. 29, 2019) 
(New Hampshire); Stewart v. Azar II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125 (D.D.C. 2019) (second Kentucky 
decision); Gresham v. Azar, 363 F. Supp. 3d 165, 169 (D.D.C. 2019) (Arkansas decision); 
Stewart v. Azar I, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 243 (D.D.C. 2018) (Stewart I) (first Kentucky decision). 
 45  Matthew Sheffield, Poll: Few Americans say they have benefited from key aspects of ObamaCare, 
THE HILL (Apr. 4, 2019), https://thehill.com/hilltv/what-americas-thinking/437401-poll-few-
americans-believe-they-have-personally-benefitted-from. 
 46  See Nicole Huberfeld, Epilogue: Health Care, Federalism, and Democratic Values, 45 AM. J. L. MED. 
247, 251 (2019) (discussing the Maine, Montana, Utah, Idaho, and Nebraska ballot initiatives 
in the context of grassroots participation and politicians’ efforts to thwart such initiatives).  
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Under the ACA, insurance coverage has improved measurably 
but falls short of universal. But, this is just one factor in the consensus 
that the work of health reform is not complete – affordability and 
complexity are also common complaints.47 Would the ACA have 
delivered better on these problems if it were implemented as 
designed?48 Abbe Gluck and I have concluded that the answer is yes.49 
But even if the ACA were implemented without NFIB’s interruption, 
the state of American health care, which still reflects the non-system 
that pre-dated the ACA, would remain irrational. The ACA was 
motivated by the glaring problem of coverage and did not vigorously 
tackle some other issues in American health care, which costs much 
more than the health systems of most wealthy nations yet delivers 
shorter life expectancy and perpetuates disparities for certain 
communities such as Black, indigenous, and people of color.50 As one 
commenter memorably wrote, health insurance now costs as much as 
a small car.51 In short, the public is prioritizing health reform so soon 
 
 47  Sarah Kliff, 8 Facts that Explain What’s Wrong with American Health Care, VOX (Jan. 20, 2015) 
https://www.vox.com/2014/9/2/6089693/health-care-facts-whats-wrong-american-insurance; 
Ashley Kirzinger et al., Data Note: American’s Challenges with Health Care Costs, KAISER FAM. 
FOUND (June 11, 2019) https://www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/data-note-americans-
challenges-health-care-costs/; Emily Gee & Topher Spiro, Excess Administrative Costs Burden 
the U.S. Health Care System, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 8, 2019), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/reports/2019/04/08/468302/excess-
administrative-costs-burden-u-s-health-care-system/; Austin Frakt, The Astonishingly High 
Administrative Costs of U.S. Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/16/upshot/costs-health-care-us.html; Bill Siwicki, Here are 
6 Major Issues Facing Healthcare in 2019, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Jan. 17, 2019), 
https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/here-are-6-major-issues-facing-healthcare-2019-
according-pwc. 
 48  See generally Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 18 (detailing the first five years of the 
implementation of the ACA with emphasis on the structural and substantive differences in 
the federalism of the law as enacted compared to the law as implemented). 
 49  Id. 
 50  Steven H. Woolf & Heidi Schoomaker, Life Expectancy and Mortality Rates in the United States, 
1959-2017, 322 JAMA 1996 (2019) (available at https://jamanetwork.com/journals 
/jama/article-abstract/2756187); see also ORG. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., HEALTH AT A 
GLANCE 2019: OECD INDICATORS (2019), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver 
/4dd50c09en.pdf?expires=1589998199&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=AC4537397D75A
CC7E8AC3F3DCC07B31B.   
 51  Drew Altman, Health Care Costs as Much as a New Car, AXIOS (Aug. 23, 2019), https:// 
www.axios.com/health-care-costs-insurance-premiums-deductibles-car-580fa6c8-0dd2-
427b-8dda-c898d568e51e.html. 
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after the ACA because costs are high, complexity overwhelms, and 
truly universal coverage has not been achieved. 
 
II. Features of Current Proposals  
This part begins with a brief overview of Medicare as a point of 
comparison for a summary of the landscape of health reform 
proposals. I place the proposals on a spectrum of disruption relative to 
the existing health care system, spanning from a truly national public 
health insurance program to a state option to allow the uninsured to 
buy in to Medicaid. The details of each bill are less important here than 
the goals and structure of each proposal, what it would change or 
disrupt in the existing legislative landscape, and which major issues 
are confronted.52 The bills introduced in the 116th Congress are 
discussed in order of public or private insurance orientation, which 
can also be characterized in terms of the bill’s degree of disruption. I 
also include notable state-based reforms, as they build on Medicaid 
and are part of the current conversation. The word disruption 
admittedly has become overused, but here it aids in describing the 
degree to which these proposals move the path dependent American 
health care non-system away from existing frameworks. 
 
A. Medicare Overview 
Given the general misconceptions regarding the meaning of a 
Medicare for All plan, a brief overview of the actual Medicare program 
is a useful place to begin. Medicare is an American national social 
insurance program, covering everyone who has paid into Social 
Security for forty quarters at age 65 and those who are permanently 
disabled whether elderly or not.53 Medicare provides health insurance 
benefits that are generally deemed essential but also incomplete in 
scope (discussed below).54 Medicare was created to cover the nation’s 
 
 52  See Compare Medicare-for-all and Public Plan Proposals, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 15, 2019), 
https://www.kff.org/interactive/compare-medicare-for-all-public-plan-proposals/.  
 53  42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 – 1395lll (2015). 
 54  Due in part to “medical necessity” definition and historic concepts of ‘comprehensive’ 
coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2015). The ACA updated Medicare’s medical necessity 
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elderly because they were impoverishing themselves and their 
families to obtain medical care in the years after World War II.55 Prior 
federal grant-in-aid programs boosting state medical welfare 
programs proved inadequate to the task of delivering consistent 
medical care and failed to stem the increasing rate of 
impoverishment.56 States did not consistently adopt those federal 
grant programs, even when they grew more generous; and, even when 
states did, benefits were not consistently delivered. The elderly 
successfully lobbied for a nationalized program, and politicians were 
ready to hear their complaint; Medicare was the answer.  
Medicare is not quite the program the national conversation paints 
it to be, and at least three salient features are not being discussed. First, 
while Medicare is a federal program with no state governance or 
policymaking, it is regionally administered by private insurance 
companies that contract with the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) to manage the program. Contractors have had a role in 
Medicare from the beginning of the program in 1965. Likewise, 
regional administration always has been a feature of the program. 
Second, private health insurers, i.e. managed care organizations, have 
been delivering the distinct Medicare benefits through Medicare “Part 
C” since 1997.57 Other forms of private insurance also have worked 
with Medicare. For example, when prescription drugs were added in 
2003 (“Part D”), the drug coverage was provided solely through stand-
alone, privately run drug insurance plans, a new commercial 
insurance creature, and the Secretary’s authority was limited 
regarding certain key features of Part D such as price negotiation.58 
Third, Medicare is a product of its enactment era, providing hospital 
benefits and some outpatient benefits but never covering all of the 
 
definition. Pub. L. No. 111-148, §4103, applicable to services furnished on or after Jan. 1, 2011; 
§4103(e), set out as a note under 42 U.S.C.A. §1395l (2015). 
 55  50th Anniversary of Medicare and Medicaid, LBJ PRESIDENTIAL LIBR., http://www.lbjlibrary.org 
/50th-anniversary-of-medicare-and-medicaid (last visited Sept. 1, 2020).  
 56  ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA 24-31 (Free Press 2d 
ed. 2004). 
 57  Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997). 
 58  42 U.S.C. § 1395w–111(i) (The Secretary of HHS is forbidden to negotiate drug prices, what 
some call the “non-interference clause.”). 
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medical needs or costs for the elderly.59 Medigap is a private insurance 
product, regulated by HHS,60 that supplements and complements 
Medicare’s benefit structure and is purchased by approximately 29% 
of Medicare beneficiaries.61  
In short, Medicare is not the government-only, universal, uniform, 
and comprehensive public insurance program many believe it to be. 
The missing pieces are important, because Medicare always had a role 
for private insurance and never included comprehensive benefits. As 
such, the phrase “Medicare for All” is confusing because the 
proponents of this idea seem to mean something more complete and 
inclusive than Medicare. What is meant by these words is a question 
that must be answered before anyone can determine whether 
Medicare for All is the future of health reform. 
Current proposals do not reflect precise use of the word Medicare 
but rather something more atmospheric, meaning some kind of 
legislative reform that offers more in the way of national public 
insurance. “Medicare” is used as a public relations tool, knowing it is 
a politically popular program that could draw in public support;62 
 
 59  DANIEL J. SCHREINER, CTR. MEDICAID & MEDICARE SERVS., OFFICE OF THE MEDICARE 
OMBUDSMAN: IMPROVING MEDICARE FOR BENEFICIARIES 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (2010), 
https://www.cms.gov/media/68976; FRED RICCARDI, JULIE CARTER & RACHEL BENNETT, 
MEDICARE RTS. CTR., MEDICARE TRENDS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2017 CALL 
DATA FROM THE MEDICARE RIGHTS CENTER’S NATIONAL HELPLINE 3, 5 (2019), 
https://www.medicarerights.org/pdf/2017-helpline-trends-report.pdf (beneficiaries’ 
complaints about costs in Medicare); Sean Williams, Medicare’s Biggest Problem Is Probably Not 
What You Think, MOTLEY FOOL (July 11, 2018), https://www.fool.com/retirement 
/general/2016/02/21/medicares-biggest-problem-is-probably-not-what-you.aspx (explaining 
Medicare’s complexities); Martine G. Brousse, Medicare Part C is No Advantage for Providers, 
NERD WALLET (Sept. 10, 2014),  https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/health /medicare-
advantage-part-c-providers/ (reporting complaints about hidden costs in Part C plans). 
 60  42 U.S.C. § 1395ss (2015). 
 61   Juliette Cubanski et al., Sources of Supplemental Coverage Among Medicare Beneficiaries in 2016, 
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/sources-of-
supplemental-coverage-among-medicare-beneficiaries-in-2016/ (Four in five Medicare 
beneficiaries have supplemental coverage of some kind; about 30% have ESI to supplement 
Medicare and 22% have Medicaid coverage.). 
 62  SANDERS.SENATE.GOV, Summary of the Medicare for All Act, https://www.sanders .senate.gov 
/newsroom (follow “Directions” hyperlink; then click the magnifying glass search icon in the 
right corner and search “Sanders, 14 Senators Introduce Medicare for All”, scroll down to the 
bottom of the page and select “For a summary of the Medicare for All Act, click here”) 
(directly available at https://www.sanders.senate.gov/download/medicare-for-all-2019-
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“Medicare” also indicates federal government-run, uniform public 
insurance. Some use “Medicare” to signal public insurance available 
to everyone or to indicate exclusion of private insurance. Others use it 
to signal (or seek) administrative ease. At a high level of 
generalization, “Medicare” has become the proxy for a few concepts: 
universal coverage, programmatic and administrative simplification, 
lower patient costs for coverage and care, greater equity, and (perhaps) 
one single public payer for health care.  
 
B. Medicare for All  ̶ Single Payer Models 
At one end of this spectrum are two Medicare for All bills, each 
proposing a uniform, public health insurance program for all United 
States residents  ̶ a national, government run “single payer” model of 
health care finance. The two bills are Representative Jayapal’s 
“Medicare for All Act”63 and Senator Sanders’s “Medicare for All 
Act.”64 Both bills create a federal, public, health insurance program, 
but the bills have key differences too – highlighting that even M4A 
does not have one meaning in legislative proposals trying to create the 
same kind of program.65 
 
1. Actual Single Payer 
Jayapal’s bill establishes a new national health insurance program 
that covers all residents, beginning at birth, which would be phased in 
over two years.66 Immigrants are included and citizenship status is not 
a barrier, though the bill tasks HHS with ensuring that medical 
tourism to the U.S. does not take advantage of the program. The bill 
forbids private insurers and employers’ self-funded plans from 
 
summary?id=FA52728F-B57E-4E0D-96C2-F0C5D346A6E1&download=1&inline=file).   
 63  Medicare For All Act of 2019, H.R. 1384, 116th Cong. (2019) (available at 
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr1384/BILLS-116hr1384ih.pdf). 
 64   Medicare For All Act of 2019, S. 1129, 116th Cong. (2019) (available at https://www. 
congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1129/text). 
 65  Micah Johnson et al., Medicare for All: An Analysis of Key Policy Issues, 39 HEALTH AFF. 133, 135 
(2020) (for a rundown of some key features of the two bills, the chart at Exhibit 1 is especially 
useful). 
 66  Katie Keith, Unpacking the House Medicare-For-All Bill, HEALTH AFF. (Mar. 3, 2019), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190302.150578/full/.  
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duplicating the outlined and rather generous Medicare for All 
insurance benefits so that if private insurance continued to exist, it 
could not compete with Medicare for All. The bill does not rely on 
private insurers to administer the program. Regional federal offices 
would be established to administer the program, rejecting Medicare’s 
contractor system.  
Jayapal’s is the most comprehensive public insurance proposal in 
terms of benefits. For example, and perhaps most unusually, the bill 
includes long-term care in the list of covered services. Many are 
surprised that Medicaid, not Medicare, covers the great majority of 
long-term services and supports, including nursing home care for the 
elderly, and this issue is often the elephant in the room when health 
reform is debated. The bill also uniquely draws on core, distinctive 
Medicaid concepts, such as the comprehensive Early and Periodic 
Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) benefit requirements 
for children.67 The bill would also permit states to provide additional 
benefits beyond what the national Medicare for All program covers.68 
But, Medicaid would not exist as a separate public program because 
this bill creates one federal payer for health care. Many have questions 
about how funding would work for these proposals, but only one 
payment plan exists so far, and it is discussed below. 
 
2. Very Nearly Single Payer 
Senator Sanders’s bill is substantially similar to Jayapal’s. This bill 
uses the name Medicare purposefully as a PR tool69 and builds on 
existing Medicare by expanding benefits, decreasing out of pocket 
costs by eliminating co-payments and deductibles, and lowering the 
age of eligibility to birth during a four-year phase-in period. Private 
insurers and employer self-insurance plans are prohibited from 
competing with the national program. Both bills eliminate the 2003 
prohibition on HHS negotiating prescription drug prices for Medicare 
Part D.70 
 
 67  H.R. 1384 § 201a(12) (2019). 
 68  H.R. 1384 § 201(e) (2019). 
 69  SANDERS.SENATE.GOV, supra note 62. 
 70   Medicare at 50 Act, S. 470 § 3, 116th Cong. (2019) (available at https://www.congress 
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A notable difference from Jayapal’s bill is that Medicaid remains 
for the limited role of covering institutional long-term care. The 
Sanders bill does not address whether HHS would retain 
demonstration waiver authority (section 1115 of the Social Security 
Act, of which Medicare and Medicaid are also part), which states have 
used to circumvent federal rules.71 Otherwise, Medicare, Medicaid, 
and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) as they currently 
exist would end, and Medicare would become the only public 
insurance program for U.S. residents for all other medical care. 
Veterans and Native Americans would retain distinct federal medical 
programs. 
Senator Sanders has advocated for single-payer public health 
insurance for many years with few co-sponsors, but this bill became 
co-sponsored by many senators, some of whom were candidates vying 
for the Democratic nomination, such as Senators Cory Booker, Kirsten 
Gillibrand, Kamala Harris, and Elizabeth Warren.72 For Democrats 
who were trying to capture the party’s nomination, Medicare for All 
became an early litmus test73 – even though the candidates did not 
seem to understand deeply what it means and may have been tripped 
up by the high stakes, and highly technical, early policy issue. For 
example, Senator Harris wavered on whether private insurance would 
have a role in a Medicare for All program,74 seemingly not 
appreciating the current system or Senator Sanders’s advocacy for a 
new single payer system with no private insurance. Critics jumped at 
 
.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/470/text). 
 71  S. 1129 Sec. 1947. Medicare for All Act, S. 1129, 116th Cong. §204 (2019)( “Title XIX of the 
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq.) is amended by inserting the following section after 
section 1946:”STATE PLAN FOR PROVIDING INSTITUTIONAL LONG-TERM CARE 
SERVICES “Sec. 1947. (a) In General…”). 
 72  See, e.g., Alexander Burns, Gillibrand Drops Out of 2020 Democratic Presidential Race, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/28/us/politics/kirsten-gillibrand-2020-
drop-out.html (Gillibrand dropped out of the primaries race on Aug. 28, 2019, before the third 
primary debate). 
 73  See, e.g., Astead W. Herndon, Elizabeth Warren Isn’t Talking Much About ‘Medicare for All’ 
Anymore, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/01/us/politics 
/elizabeth-warren-medicare-for-all.html  (reporting some candidates backing off of the idea). 
 74  Dan Diamond & Christopher Cadelago, Kamala Harris’ new health plan: ‘Medicare for All’-with 
private insurers, POLITICO (July 29, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/29/ kamala-
harris-medicare-for-all-1438631. 
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this misunderstanding, but Harris was not alone; Senator Booker and 
others had similar moments, like most Americans trying to understand 
how health care works.75 
The structure of M4A, whether a Jayapal or a Sanders plan, would 
be highly disruptive to the health care landscape. Senator Warren laid 
out the cost of a single-payer proposal in broad strokes using a few 
major revenue buckets, with numbers projected over ten years.76 These 
figures include: reduction in administrative costs from eliminating 
private insurance and keeping federal administrative spending at 
2.3%, payment reform that caps provider reimbursements at 110% of 
current Medicare rates with adjustments for rural and teaching 
hospitals, preventing consolidation between providers, and limiting 
drug costs (Warren appears to measure these reforms at $350 billion); 
redirecting state and local spending on health care to M4A ($6 trillion); 
employer taxes to replace ESI ($9 trillion) with possible supplemental 
taxes on employers if funding falls short; increased wages due to 
decreased employment benefits that are taxable ($1.15 trillion); better 
tax enforcement ($2.5 trillion); taxing the wealthy ($3.2 trillion all 
together); limits on defense spending ($798 billion); and immigration 
reform that creates more taxable income ($400 billion).77 Warren’s plan 
claims the total cost would be less than $52 trillion over ten years, and 
by her team’s calculation, maintaining the current system would cost 
more than $52 trillion over the same period.78 
Whether or not this price tag is a sound estimate,79 it is safe to 
assume that system-wide financial shifts would occur in a national 
 
 75  Emily Stewart, Cory Booker had a confusing answer about health care in his first 2020 press 
conference, VOX (Feb. 1, 2019, 5:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics 
/2019/2/1/18207383/cory-booker-2020-medicare-for-all. 
 76  Elizabeth Warren, Ending the Stranglehold of Health Care Costs on American Families, 
(@teamwarren), MEDIUM (Nov. 1, 2019), https://medium.com/@teamwarren/ending-the-
stranglehold-of-health-care-costs-on-american-families-bf8286b13086 (last visited Nov. 27, 
2019). 
 77  Id. 
 78  Jacob Pramuk, Elizabeth Warren says she would not raise middle-class taxes for $52 trillion health-
care plan, CNBC (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/01/elizabeth-warren-releases-
plan-to-pay-for-medicare-for-all.html.  
 79  Cf. LINDA J. BLUMBERG ET AL., URB. INST. & COMMONWEALTH FUND, FROM INCREMENTAL TO 
COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM: HOW VARIOUS REFORM OPTIONS COMPARE ON 
COVERAGE AND COSTS 11 (2019), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/2019/10/15 
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single-payer program. For example, the federal government no longer 
would forgo the $200 billion it exempts from employer and employee 
wage taxes. It is not clear whether dollar-for-dollar wage replacement 
occurs, i.e., that employers relieved of the expense of ESI 
correspondingly raise wages to the level that health insurance costs the 
employer.80 Assuming employers pay employees higher wages upon 
ceasing ESI, a new stream of taxable employee income would increase 
the flow collected by the federal government and by states with 
income taxes. Correspondingly, the 56% of the nonelderly population 
that has ESI81 would not pay thousands of dollars per year in 
premiums and other out of pocket costs to private corporations. 
Rather, a new tax structured something like the Social Security tax is 
likely to occur. Providers would be subject to government-negotiated 
payment rates, perhaps like the complex algorithms Medicare 
currently uses. For example, the Warren plan proposes to pay health 
care providers slightly more than Medicare does now, which would be 
helpful to Medicaid and other safety net providers but a possible loss 
for providers primarily serving private insurance populations. 
Whether all providers could thrive within a more heavily negotiated 
payment system is an open question.82 Advocacy groups for providers 




 80  See Austin Frakt, Would Your Wages Rise Under ‘Medicare for All’?, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT 
(Feb. 3, 2020, 12:00 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/03/upshot/wages-medicare-for-
all.html (summarizing on the debate about the replaced wages question). 
 81  Michelle Long et. al., Trends in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Offer and Coverage Rates, 1999-
2014, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.kff.org/report-section/trends-in-
employer-sponsored-insurance-offer-and-coverage-rates-1999-2014-issue-brief/ (last visited 
Apr. 23, 2020). 
 82  Priyanka Dayal McCluskey, Bucking industry line, some hospital chiefs see benefits of Medicare for 
All, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2019/11/26 /bucking-
industry-line-some-hospital-chiefs-see-benefits-medicare-for-
all/W00HUadCViVYBbOyajclvL/story.html (exploring the question of whether hospitals 
uniformly reject a single payer approach). 
 83  See Alex Gangitano, Top lobbying groups dive into ‘Medicare for All’ debate, THE HILL (June 28, 
2019, 01:04 PM), https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/450901-top-lobbying-groups-part-
of-medicare-for-all-debate; see also Adam Cancryn, The Army Built to Fight ‘Medicare for All’, 
POLITICO (Nov. 25, 2019, 05:08 AM),  https://www.politico.com/news/agenda/2019 
/11/25/medicare-for-all-lobbying-072110 (reporting on Partnership for America’s Health Care 
Future, a health care industry lobbying cooperative “designed to overwhelm not just the 
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community health centers, may be squeezed the most, so some are 
beginning to acknowledge their specific needs.84 But, many criticize 
the costs of American health care as senselessly high, especially 
relative to America’s health outcomes.85 Some price de-escalation is not 
inherently dangerous to the continued existence of all health care 
providers.86 This paper cannot offer a complete analysis with so many 
details still to be decided, but rather I highlight immediate foreseeable 
changes, which indicate why the M4A bills would be the most 
disruptive to implement. 
 
C. Medicare Expansion  
Two bills expand Medicare eligibility for people over age 50 not 
eligible for other insurance coverage, a group that had trouble gaining 
insurance coverage before the ACA. I call this concept “Medicare 
expansion,” rather than the more common “Medicare buy in,” because 
Medicare eligibility would be expanded in similar fashion to Medicaid 
expansion under the ACA. It seems the root of this idea is in the ACA’s 
expansion successes (and failures). 
 
swelling Medicare for All movement, but every single Democratic proposal that would 
significantly expand the government’s role in health care.”). 
 84  See generally Nicole Huberfeld, Rural Health, Universality, and Legislative Targeting, 13 HARV. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 241 (2019). 
 85  See generally, ELIZABETH ROSENTHAL, AN AMERICAN SICKNESS (Penguin Books ed., 2018) 
(cataloging for public reading the high costs of American health care and proposing plans of 
action for laypeople); Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s the Prices Stupid: Why The United States Is 
So Different From Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFFS. 89 (2003); Bradley Sawyer & Cynthia Cox, 
How does health spending in the U.S. compare to other countries?, PETERSON-KAISER FAM. FOUND.  
(Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/health-spending-u-s-
compare-countries/; OECD Health Statistics 2019, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV.,  (Jan. 13, 
2020), https://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/health-data.htm (“At 17.1%, the United 
States spent the highest share of GDP on health in 2017, while Turkey allocated around 4.2% 
of its GDP in the same year.”). 
 86  Emily Rappleye, Princeton economists: Physicians are ‘taking money away from the rest of us’, 
BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-
physician-relationships/princeton-economists-physicians-are-taking-money-away-from-the-
rest-of-us.html (economists Ann Case and Angus Deaton called physicians an untouchable 
“rent-seeking conspiracy.”).  
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Senator Stabenow’s “Medicare at 50 Act”87 permits people aged 
50-64 to buy into the existing Medicare program and does not dislocate 
other portions of the health care system. The bill provides subsidies 
much like the tax credits available to individuals purchasing insurance 
in the exchanges.88 It also prevents states from using Medicare 
expansion to purchase insurance for Medicaid-eligible populations 
(cost-shifting to the federal government that states have tried in the 
past).89 Stabenow’s bill also enables HHS to negotiate Part D drug 
prices.90 
Representative Higgins’s related bill, the “Medicare Buy-In and 
Health Care Stabilization Act,” is substantially similar.91 This bill 
expands Medicare eligibility to people aged 50-64, allows variation in 
premiums for these younger enrollees, and makes Medicare expansion 
coverage available to be purchased through exchanges like qualified 
health plans.92 In addition, this bill reverses actions the Trump 
administration has taken to undermine the exchanges, such as 
reinvigorating risk corridor payments and reinstating and enhancing 
cost sharing reductions for all exchange plan participants, which 
would help to stabilize the exchanges while adding this new Medicare-
eligible population.93  Like the Stabenow plan, the Higgins bill would 
not eliminate private insurance or other public insurance programs. 
The Higgins bill uniquely creates a Medigap public option, a new kind 
of Medigap coverage that could be purchased by the Medicare 
expansion population and traditional beneficiaries. 
Both bills connect Medicare expansion to the existing ACA rules 
for purchasing qualified health plans (QHPs) on the exchanges, 
thereby increasing the number of individuals purchasing insurance 
through the exchanges and potentially fortifying exchange structures. 
It is difficult to predict what impact the private insurers offering QHPs 
 
 87  See generally Medicare at 50 Act, S. 470, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 88  Id. at § 2(f). 
 89  S. 470, 116th Cong. § 2(g)(4). 
 90  Id. at § 3. 
 91  See generally Medicare Buy-In and Health Care Stabilization Act of 2019, H.R. 1346, 116th 
Cong. (2019). 
 92  Id. at § 3(h). 
 93  H.R. 1346, 116th Cong. §§ 7–8. 
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would experience. Existing plans could lose enrollment to Medicare, 
but they could also raise prices so that lower income subscribers are 
compelled to purchase the public option, which would improve 
private insurers’ risk pools. QHPs, alternatively, could participate in 
Medicare expansion as Part C plans, which allow commercial 
managed care organizations to deliver Medicare benefits within 
flexible parameters. All plans seem likely to have shifting subscribers. 
Some enrolled in QHPs might move to a Medicare expansion product, 
but if QHPs opt to become Medicare expansion insurers, then some 
insurers in the exchanges would have a steady number of enrollees. 
Insurers that do not currently provide Part C plans might be 
incentivized to do so.  
These bills could be moderately disruptive because they invite a 
new population into Medicare, expanding eligibility for that public 
program in a novel way. From an insurance market perspective, 
Medicare expansion appears to be an option that, aside from Medicare 
for All, is least like what exists in the current health care system 
because it adds a significant population to the one truly national, fairly 
uniform health insurance program. On the other hand, Medicare 
expansion could be argued to be non-disruptive because so many 
health care providers already participate in Medicare, and this would 
simply invite more, younger people to be covered by that familiar 
program. The disruption is less likely to be on the provider side and 
more likely on the commercial insurance market side. The cost of 
Medicare expansion may be comparable to Part C, which historically 
has been more expensive than traditional Medicare because private 
insurers have higher administrative costs and pay providers more.94 
But Medicare expansion would be covering a population that has had 
a hard time obtaining ESI and, at least initially, could be sicker and 
thus more expensive to cover. Over time, this cost dynamic would 
smooth out. No price estimate exists yet for these bills. 
 
 
 94  See generally, David U. Himmelstein et al., Health Care Administrative Costs in the United States 
and Canada, 172 ANNALS INTERNAL MED., 134–142 (2020) (describing and analyzing 
differences in administrative costs for private insurance in the U.S. and Canada). 
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D. New Public Insurance Options 
A handful of bills create a “Public Option,” meaning publicly 
created and sponsored health insurance that competes with existing 
public and private health insurance options, though which plans 
remain varies by the bill. At the maximalist end, the public option 
replaces other public insurance and some private insurance. At the 
minimalist end, the public option is sold in competition with QHPs 
offered through the exchanges. In short, this would be a federal, 
government-run insurance plan, sold as a competitor in the same 
markets. This category includes five bills, some of which rely on the 
brand name of Medicare but do not involve the existing Medicare 
program. 
The “Medicare for America Act” takes a maximalist approach to a 
public option and is sponsored by Representative DeLauro (with no 
Senate related bill).95 This bill creates a federally run health plan that 
will operate as a QHP to be offered through health insurance 
exchanges but morphs into a public plan to which all lawful residents 
are entitled at birth and supplants Medicaid, Medicare, and most 
private insurance (nongroup and small group, exchanges are phased 
out). ESI remains a source of coverage, and some people with 
qualifying coverage (largely through ESI) could opt out of the public 
plan.96 State agencies responsible for administering Medicaid would 
be in control of enrollment in each state.97 State laws that could 
interfere with the public plan are preempted. Those earning less than 
200% of the FPL would not pay premiums or cost sharing; those 
earning 200-600% of the FPL would pay premiums on a sliding scale; 
those earning more would have premiums capped at 8% of income.98 
Medicare for America would simplify both existing public insurance 
and publicly-sponsored private insurance (Medicare, Medicaid, tax-
credit supported small and nongroup insurance, exchanges) but leaves 
 
 95  See generally H.R. 2452, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 96  Id. at § 2202(b)(4)(A). 
 97  Id. at § 2202(b)(1). 
 98  Tricia Neuman et al., 10 Key Questions on Public Option Proposals, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 
18, 2019), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/10-key-questions-on-public-option-
proposals/. 
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employers in the health insurance game. This approach sustains and 
modifies the hybrid public/private insurance scheme, administratively 
simplifying it and making the public insurance more inclusive 
(enrollment eventually becomes automatic at birth). States retain a role 
in health policy by administering the expanded Medicare program and 
by having an option to cover those not eligible for Medicare for 
America (namely undocumented immigrants). 
The next four bills all create a new “public option” similar to the 
public option debated when the ACA was drafted: the Choose 
Medicare Act, an identical bill sponsored by Senator Merkley and 
Representative Richmond;99 Medicare-X Choice Act, an identical bill 
sponsored by Senator Bennet and Representative Delgado;100 Keeping 
Health Insurance Affordable Act, sponsored by Senator Cardin;101 and 
the Consumer Health Options and Insurance Competition 
Enhancement Act (CHOICE Act), an identical bill sponsored by 
Representative Schakowsky and Senator Whitehouse.102 “Public 
option” in these bills means creating a new, federally-run public health 
insurance plan, available for purchase on the exchange, with some 
variation in features. For example, the Choose Medicare Act and the 
Medicare-X Choice Act would increase the federal premium tax 
subsidies for all exchange participants. The Cardin bill and the 
Merkley/Richmond bill increase the income level at which individuals 
can receive tax credits, up to 600% of the FPL.103 All of the plans operate 
by adding a new public plan to exchange markets with some differing 
eligibility. For example, the Keeping Health Insurance Affordable Act 
and the CHOICE Act are the narrowest bills, adding one federal plan 
to the exchange with no enhanced subsidies. The Medicare-X bill adds 
 
 99  See generally Choose Medicare Act, S. 1261, 116th Cong. (2019); see also H.R. 2463, 116th Cong. 
(2019). 
 100  See generally Medicare-X Choice Act of 2019, S. 981, 116th Cong. (2019); see also H.R. 2000, 
116th Cong. (2019). 
 101  See generally Keeping Health Insurance Affordable Act, S. 3, 116th Cong. (2019).  
 102  See generally Consumer Health Options and Insurance Competition Enhancement Act H.R. 
2085; see also S. 1033 (Consumer Health Options and Insurance Competition Enhancement 
Act, “CHOICE Act”). 
 103  See generally H.R 3590, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted) (Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act); see also 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2010) (Tax subsidies are available for those earning 100-400% of 
FPL).  
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a public plan to the exchange, phasing it in first in single insurance 
issuer and high cost areas before rolling out the public option 
nationwide, but this bill also enhances subsidies and makes the public 
option available to small groups (including small employers). The 
Choose Medicare Act creates “Medicare Part E” for anyone not already 
eligible for public insurance, and, uniquely, allows employers to offer 
Part E as a purchased health plan or to use Part E to administer self-
insured plans104 
These four bills all rely on current Medicare participating 
providers to take part in the public option at Medicare payment rates. 
All four give the Secretary of HHS authority to negotiate drug prices. 
The CHOICE Act allows (but does not require) states to advise the 
Secretary on cost control measures105 Currently this is the only bill to 
give states a formal role in the public option (aside from possibly 
running the exchange on which the public option is sold, a role offered 
to states under the ACA). None affect the Medicaid program directly. 
These plans tinker with the ACA’s private insurance structures, 
providing the public option that was hotly and briefly debated before 
it became clear that politicians in 2008 had little taste for a new 
federally-run public health insurance mechanism – the fight shaped 
up to be too big. Now, these minimalist public option plans seem 
almost conservative compared to the maximalist bills capturing much 
of the conversation.106 
The public options proposed in these bills would operate much 
like Medicare when it was enacted in 1965 – a new government-run 
insurance plan slotting into the field of health insurance products. At 
first glance, this approach does not seem as disruptive as Medicare for 
All or Medicare Expansion plans. Rather, a public option adds a new, 
 
 104  See generally Neuman et al., supra note 98. 
 105  Keeping Health Insurance Affordable Act, supra note 101. 
 106  Another interesting variation, which reflects some of the backpedaling from the early M4A 
push, is candidate Pete Buttigieg’s “Medicare for all who want it,” which also fits in this 
model. This plan would automatically enroll people eligible for the version of a public option 
he proposes and retroactively enroll those who seek health care without knowing they are 
covered. PETE 2020, MEDICARE FOR ALL WHO WANT IT: PUTTING EVERY AMERICAN IN CHARGE 
OF THEIR HEALTH CARE WITH AFFORDABLE CHOICE FOR ALL 4 (2019),  https://web.archive.org 
/web/20200218065540/https://storage.googleapis.com/pfawebapp/documents/MFAWW I 
_white_paper_FINAL.pdf. 
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yet somewhat familiar, possibility for insurance purchasers because it 
does not require existing actors to behave differently. Health insurance 
carriers may scale their pricing to be competitive with a public option. 
Alternatively, private insurers could raise rates to push undesirable 
subscribers toward a public option. Conversely, some subscribers may 
prefer the lower cost and (possibly) lower risk public option, which is 
likely to offer broader benefits than private insurance does, especially 
tempting for anyone with chronic conditions, high costs, or other 
factors causing unpredictable medical expenses. This could lead to a 
softened adverse selection (many would not be opting for insurance at 
the moment of illness, given coverage under the ACA). A public option 
could be more disruptive in private insurance markets that have just 
one or two insurers. Also, some worry that any public option would 
displace market dominant insurers and tip the scales toward public 
insurance rather than our current hybrid of public and private 
insurance.107 
Whether a public option remains a contained choice or becomes 
the proverbial camel’s nose under the tent, a public option does not 
simplify the current system, and it is difficult to predict how it would 
affect the high cost of medical care overall because no real estimates 
exist. (The Medicare for America Act is an exception, as it starts like a 
public option but veers closer to the Medicare for All bills as 
implementation progresses.) 
 
E. Medicaid Buy In  
The State Public Option Act is an identical bill sponsored by 
Senator Schatz and Representative Luján.108 This bill creates a new 
state-delivered option within Medicaid to offer Medicaid coverage to 
uninsured individuals who do not otherwise qualify for Medicaid 
expansion eligibility. States could require this newly eligible 
population to pay “actuarially fair” premiums, copayments, and 
 
 107  Helen A. Halpin & Peter Harbage, The Origins and Demise of the Public Option, 29 HEALTH 
AFFS. 1117–124 (2010) (tracing the origin of the public option idea leading to the ACA and the 
political arguments for and against it).  
 108  S. 489 & H.R. 1277, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/489/ related-
bills. 
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deductibles.109 The bill also renews the ACA’s temporary increase in 
Medicaid payment levels for primary care physicians and expands the 
types of providers who receive the increased payments.110 The bill 
eliminates the Hyde Amendment’s restriction on HHS’s ability to pay 
for abortions and makes all reproductive care mandatory for states to 
cover in Medicaid.111 
The State Public Option Act both builds on and reinforces the 
ACA’s Medicaid expansion, restarting federal supermatch payments 
(100% federal funding) to expansion hold-out states for the first three 
years of expansion.112 It also allows states to cover their entire 
uninsured population through Medicaid buy-in, even if the uninsured 
are eligible to purchase insurance through an exchange. Enrollment for 
the Medicaid buy-in could be limited to the exchange open-enrollment 
period rather than the traditional permanent open enrollment of 
Medicaid.  
The Medicaid-based public option could shift some low-income 
individuals from private insurance or ESI to Medicaid coverage, but 
the number would be low in states that have already expanded 
Medicaid eligibility. Some of the individuals who are eligible for tax 
credit assisted purchase of insurance on an exchange may opt instead 
for Medicaid, as it has much lower out-of-pocket costs. The Medicaid 
Act has largely forbid cost sharing (like copays), and premiums are 
rarely allowed. The “actuarially valid” cost of this plan is too vague to 
evaluate.  
The structure of this bill is different from the other bills and from 
existing insurance possibilities because it fashions a Medicaid-based 
“public option” that, like traditional Medicaid, relies on states to 
choose to implement this new policy. To a degree, this approach 
targets frustrations of low to middle income individuals who cannot 
afford the high out-of-pocket costs of private insurance plans on the 
 
 109  S. 489 & H.R. 1277, § 2(d). 
 110  S. 489 & H.R. 1277, § 4. Senate Bill 489; House Bill 1277 § 4. The ACA increased primary care 
payments to Medicare levels to incentivize physicians to take newly covered beneficiaries. 
 111  S. 489 & H.R. 1277, § 6. Senate Bill 489 § 6. House Bill 1277 § 6. Most of the bills eliminate the 
Hyde Amendment or make reproductive health care more broadly accessible in some way. 
 112  S. 489 & H.R. 1277, § 5. See also Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
431, 451 (2011) (coining “supermatch,” the ACA’s 100% match initiated to help states with 
the newly eligible beneficiaries). 
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exchanges – anyone who could buy insurance on an exchange could 
choose the Medicaid public option – and the idea appears popular in 
polling.113 But, states that have resisted exercising the options in 
Medicaid historically, or that have opted out of ACA Medicaid 
expansion (often the same states), are unlikely to take up a new public 
option even though it is the most federalism-centric, or state-inclusive, 
of the current bills. As is discussed below, the constitutional structure 
of this bill is not straightforward for the simple fact that states are given 
a key role in governance.  
 
F. State-based Measures 
A few states have considered creating a form of public option 
rather than wait for Congress. So far, Washington is the only state to 
enact a state-based public insurance plan, called Cascade Care, enacted 
in 2019.114 Cascade Care will be sold starting in 2021 through the 
exchange, which is state-run, and it does not actually create a public 
health insurance program. Rather, Washington will contract with 
private insurers to administer Cascade Care’s “standardized health 
plans” as defined by state law, and the state will control the terms of 
the plans to achieve goals like managing costs, such as, capping 
payments to providers at 160% of Medicare reimbursement rates. 
Insurers participating in Cascade Care are not required to offer plans 
state-wide. This kind of attempt at price control may offer a model for 
other states or for the federal government if it creates a public option, 
but the program is too new to know if its rate controls will be effective, 
well received by providers, or otherwise successful. 
Colorado’s governor signed similar legislation on May 17, 2019.115 
HB 1004 focuses on providing a public insurance option for rural and 
 
 113  Health Tracking Poll – January 2019: The Public On Next Steps For The ACA And Proposals To 
Expand Coverage, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/poll-
finding/kff-health-tracking-poll-january-2019/.  
 114 See generally S.B. 5526, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019) (available at 
https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary? BillNumber=5526&Initiative=false&Year=2019); see also 
Austin Jenkins, Will Washington State’s New ‘Public Option’ Plan Reduce Health Care Costs?, NPR 
(May 16, 2019), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2019 /05/16/723843559 /will-
washington-states-new-public-option-plan-reduce-heath-care-costs. 
 115  H.B. 19-1004, Gen. Assemb, Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019) (available at https://leg. 
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mountain communities, which have higher costs for insurance 
coverage and, often, just one plan available. The bill directs state 
agencies to complete a proposal for implementing the bill by 
November 2019.116 Other states have had similar bills gain traction but 
either have not been enacted or only started studies. For example, 
Nevada’s “Sprinklecare” (sponsored by Assemblyman Mike Sprinkle) 
was structured as a Medicaid buy in, but Governor Brian Sandoval 
vetoed it. Sprinkle revived the bill in 2019 when a new governor took 
office.117 New Mexico’s legislature considered bills that operate like a 
Medicaid buy-in but without federal funding, and a task force is 
studying the policy.118 Massachusetts had a public option bill that was 
not enacted.119 Connecticut had a public option bill working through 
the legislature in 2019 that was defeated by insurance industry 
lobbying.120 A handful of other states have taken similar actions.121 
A few states have attempted to craft intra-state single payer, but 
none have succeeded so far. For example, Vermont’s “Green Mountain 
Care” was to be the first state-run public health insurance plan that 
would eliminate other forms of health insurance within the state, but 
 
colorado.gov/bills/hb19-1004); see also Scott Miller, Colorado Gov. Polis signs landmark health care 
legislation in Vail, POST INDEP. (May 18, 2019), https://www.postindependent.com 
/news/colorado-gov-polis-signs-landmark-health-care-legislation-in-vail/. 
 116  Associated Press, Colorado lawmakers OK bill to develop public health insurance option, DENVER 
POST (Apr. 23, 2019, 5:12 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2019/04/23/colorado-public-
health-insurance-option/. 
 117  Jessie Bekker, Nevada Assemblyman Sprinkle to take another shot at Medicaid buy-in law, LAS 
VEGAS REV. J. (Feb. 2, 2019), https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/politics-and-
government/2019-legislature/nevada-assemblyman-sprinkle-to-take-another-shot-at-
medicaid-buy-in-law-1588235/. 
 118  H.B. 416, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2019), https://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/19% 
20Regular/bills/house /HB0416.pdf; S.B. 405, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2019), 
https://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/19%20 Regular/bills/senate/SB0405.pdf. 
 119  S. 697, 191st Sess. (Mass. 2019) (available at https://malegislature.gov/Bills/191/SD40). 
 120  Harris Meyer, Cigna helps shoot down Connecticut public-option bill, MOD. HEALTHCARE (May 
30, 2019), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/insurance/cigna-helps-shoot-down-conn 
ecticut-public-option-bill. 
 121  See Heather Howard, Map: State Efforts to Develop Medicaid Buy-In Programs, ST. HEALTH & 
VALUE STRATEGIES (June 4, 2019), https://www.shvs.org/state-efforts-to-develop-medicaid-
buy-in-programs/; see also Sabrina Corlette et al., States Seek to Improve Affordability, Expand 
Coverage with “Public Option” and Medicaid Buy-in Proposals, GEO. U. HEALTH POL’Y INST. (Jan. 
2020), https://Georgetown.app.box.com/s/hxb7k4 wx9ood1t3a8he0h53qqonqurps. 
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the governor dropped the plan claiming it was unattainable with the 
state’s limited budget.122 California’s repeated single payer bills have 
passed the legislature only to be vetoed or stall, though Governor 
Newsome proposed covering undocumented immigrants and 
supports a single payer approach.123 Colorado’s single-payer ballot 
measure, Amendment 69, failed in 2016.124  
While states are playing a role in health reform, the impetus is that 
the Trump administration’s policy is to undermine the law of the ACA 
and its plan for universal coverage.125 After the ACA, this is not the 
policy space that the nation was supposed to be exploring. Though a 
handful of states are worth watching for stopgap and forward-
thinking measures, this minority does not indicate that health reform 
is shifting to the states.126 To the contrary, states are also testing out 
anti-universality approaches with the encouragement of the Trump 




 122  Sarah Kliff, How Vermont’s single-payer health care dream fell apart, VOX (Dec. 22, 2014), 
https://www.vox.com/2014/12/22/7427117/single-payer-vermont-shumlin; Amy Goldstein, 




 123  Sophia Bollag, Saying no to the nurses: California Democrats aren’t pushing government-run health 
care this year, SACRAMENTO BEE (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-
government/capitol-alert/ article226819984.html; see also Katy Grimes, Newsom Proposes State-
Funded Health Coverage for Illegal Immigrants, CAL. GLOBE (Jan. 9, 2019), 
https://californiaglobe.com/governor/newsom-proposes-state-funded-health-coverage-for-
illegal-immigrants/.  
 124  Dylan Matthews, Single-payer health care failed miserably in Colorado last year. Here’s why., VOX 
(Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/9/14/16296132/colorado-
single-payer-ballot-initiative-failure. 
 125  See Exec. Order No. 13765, 82 Fed. Reg. 8351 (Jan. 20, 2017). 
 126  See, e.g., Sara R. Collins & Jeanne Lambrew, Federalism, the Affordable Care Act, and Health 
Reform in the 2020 Election, COMMONWEALTH FUND (July 29, 2019), https://www. 
commonwealthfund.org/publications/fund-reports/2019/jul/federalism-affordable-care-act-
health-reform-2020-election (detailing how a federalism structure has weakened the ACA’s 
reforms). 
 127  Healthy Adult Opportunity Fact Sheet, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 30, 2020), 
https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/healthy-adult-opportunity-fact-sheet (federal 
policy guidance inviting block grant proposals from states for expansion population). 
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G. Medicaid for All 
No formal Medicaid for All bill or other proposal exists, except in 
academic writing and opinion pieces.128 Medicaid has achieved what I 
have called in other work “unplanned universality”129 by 
incrementally and gradually but consistently responding to state and 
market failures to cover low-income populations’ health needs. 
Medicaid is statutorily capable of providing emergency coverage and 
is more flexible for natural disasters, epidemics, and other surprise 
events than other forms of both public and private insurance.130 
Medicaid covers around 21% of the population131, a percentage that 
reaches nearly a quarter of the population if complete Medicaid 
expansion occurred under the ACA. Medicaid covers more than 73 
million lives, including nearly half of all births, a third of all children, 
two-thirds of long-term care costs, a fifth of Medicare beneficiaries, 
and nearly half of people with disabilities.132 Medicaid is a program 
that is designed to assist the poor in particular ways, such as covering 
care retroactively when beneficiaries enroll and covering 
transportation for medical services because low-income individuals 
often have limited means of transport. Medicaid for All does not 
appear to be a serious proposal, in part because the program’s stigma 
is so sticky. The ACA has lessened the stigma to a degree, because so 
many people have become outspoken about their need for Medicaid 
 
 128  Michael Sparer, The Best Replacement for Obamacare Is Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/opinion/obamacare-repeal-medicaid.html; Lindsay 
Wiley, Medicaid for All?: State-Level Single-Payer Health Care, 79 OHIO ST. L. J. 843 (2018); Joyce 
Frieden, You’ve Heard of Medicare for All—How About Medicaid for More?, MEDPAGE TODAY 
(Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.medpagetoday.com /publichealthpolicy /medicaid/82147 
(surveying state efforts to expand Medicaid coverage). 
 129  Nicole Huberfeld, Rural Health, Universality, and Legislative Targeting, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 501 (2018) (describing Medicaid as “unplanned universalism”). 
 130   Sara Rosenbaum & Stephen Warnke, Opinion: Even with ‘Medicare for all,’ we’ll still need 
Medicaid, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion /story/2019-
09-11/medicare-for-all-bernie-sanders-debate-medicaid-public-health. 
 131   See Medicaid State Fact Sheets, KAISER FAM. FOUND, (May 27, 2020), https://www.kff.org 
/interactive/ medicaid-state-fact-sheets/.  
 132  Medicaid in the United States, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.kff.org 
/interactive/medicaid-state-fact-sheets/. 
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coverage, and because of factors such as higher education students 
being covered by Medicaid.133 Yet, while Medicaid has a core set of 
strong statutory principles, and its flexibility in spending and coverage 
must be enveloped in any new approach to health reform, Medicaid 
results in variable coverage, access, and cost because states have so 
much flexibility in the program. Variability often leads to inequity in 
health care, and this is a predictable outcome for a federalism 
structure.  
Each of the reform proposals responds in some way to gaps 
remaining in health care finance, access, and cost that the ACA began 
to address. Most notably, these bills seek to increase the role of 
government in health care finance, at the minimalist end, as a risk-
bearing market participant and, at the maximalist end, by replacing 
health insurance mechanisms that currently exist. None are anywhere 
near the time-worn bugaboo of “socialized medicine,” the classic 
model of which is the British National Health Service in which 
government runs the entire system, including employing providers 
and paying for care.134 All bills would affect the status quo to some 
degree. Few achieve administrative simplicity. While reports indicate 
that the public’s taste for M4A fluctuates, the drive for another kind of 
public insurance is consistent.135 To that end, the next part evaluates 
the policy features of these bills from a constitutional perspective. 
III. Distance between Policy and Constitutionality 
For years, Senator Sanders alone called for Medicare for All, so 
each of the Democratic candidates responding to his plan is a 
remarkable signal. The host of health reform bills before the 116th 
Congress also indicate that the needle has moved on public and 
 
 133  Sallie Thieme Sanford, Health Reform and Higher Ed: Campuses as Harbingers of Medicaid 
Universality and Medicare Commonality, 47 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 79 (2019). 
 134  60 Years Ago – American Medical Association president told Scranton crowd fight ‘Socialized 
Medicine’, THE TIMES-TRIBUNE (Jan. 21, 2020), https://insurancenewsnet.com/oarticle/60-years-
ago-american-medical-association-president-told-scranton-crowd-fight-socialized-medicine. 
 135  See Paige Winfield Cunningham, The Health 202: Medicare-for-all goes MIA on the 2020 trail. 
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perhaps political expectations.136 The ACA’s constant presence at the 
center of political conversation, somewhat ironically, appears to have 
embedded its norm, making insurance coverage at least near-
universal.137 Democrats’ debates indicated that candidates were trying 
to figure out how far to move toward single payer whether to jump on 
board or build something with similar goals achieved differently, 
mostly by agreeing that government-sponsored health insurance is 
necessary but differing with regard to its reach.138 
Also, remarkably, both Sanders and Warren campaigned on the 
idea that health care is a human right.139 Other candidates favor 
universal coverage and would advance it with some version of 
Medicare for All, Medicare expansion, or a public option, with 
differences in particulars rather than principles.140 For example, 
Senator Harris’s proposal included a comprehensive disability care 
plan and built on Medicare Part C.141 Pete Buttigieg’s proposal called 
for universal coverage and allowed private insurance to remain, 
calling his plan “Medicare for all who want it,” and focusing attention 
on the plight of rural health and Native Americans.142 Vice President 
 
 136  Lunna Lopes et al., KFF Health Tracking Poll – January 2020: Medicare-for-all, Public Option, 
Health Care Legislation And Court Actions, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 30, 2020), 
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/kff-health-tracking-poll-january-2020/ 
(“majority of Americans favor a national Medicare-for-all health plan (56%) but a larger share 
favors a government-administered “public option” (68%). Notably, nearly half of adults 
(48%) favor both of these proposals…”). 
 137  Gluck & Huberfeld, THE TRILLION DOLLAR EXPERIMENT, supra note 8. 
 138  Kevin Uhrmacher et al., Where 2020 Democrats Stand on Medicare-for-all, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/policy-2020/medicare-for-all 
/?noredirect=on. 
 139  Warren stated during the first primary debate and then wrote on Twitter: “Yes, I would 
support government-run insurance. Health care is a basic human right, and we fight for basic 
human rights. We need #MedicareForAll. #DemDebate.” Elizabeth Warren (@SenWarren), 
TWITTER (June 26, 2019, 8:26 PM), https://twitter.com/ewarren/status/11440542595472 99850 ; 
Sanders stated: “…health care is a human right, not something to make huge profits on.” 
Bernie Sanders (@BernieSanders), TWITTER (June 27, 2019, 9:19 PM), https:// 
twitter.com/berniesanders/status /1144423468328542208?lang=en. 
 140  Kevin Uhrmacher, et al., supra note 138. 
 141  See Caroline Kelly, Harris unveils disability plan focusing on education and employment 
opportunities, CNN (Aug. 29, 2019, 6:05 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/29/politics 
/kamala-harris-disability-plan/index.html. 
 142  See Tim Reid, Democrat Buttigieg unveils healthcare plan for rural Americans, tribes, REUTERS 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3531238
4_HUBERFELD POST MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/10/20  12:52 PM 
104 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
 
Biden, the presumptive nominee as this paper goes to press, would 
maintain but improve on the ACA, filling gaps with a public option 
(available without cost to individuals who fall in the coverage gap); 
increasing tax credits and other financial supports for those 
purchasing insurance on exchanges; and other features like ending 
surprise billing, limiting drug prices, and eliminating the Hyde 
Amendment.143 In reaction to the global pandemic, Biden also 
announced that he would expand Medicare eligibility to people age 60 
to 64, promoting the idea of Medicare expansion five years earlier than 
the program has allowed.144 
The details change regularly and are less consequential here than 
the themes. Across proposals, consistent ideas include: durable 
universal coverage that plugs gaps, reduces costs, and increases basic 
access (most make all residents eligible, including non-citizens); no or 
very low cost sharing; no or low premiums; specific targeting of 
prescription drug prices through government negotiation; and 
fortified access to reproductive care. These common issues suggest a 
public taste for change reminiscent of the drive for Medicare itself, 
when senior citizens decried the unpredictable implementation of 
federal grants-in-aid to states, which often did not deliver on the 
promise of federal funding because states used the money differently 
or not at all.145 Conspicuously, unlike earlier health reform efforts, the 
proposals discussed have little taste for state “flexibilities” or “states 
rights” in securing universal coverage. This kind of call for uniformly 
accessible public insurance coverage has not occurred since Harry 
Truman attempted universal health insurance coverage after World 
War II.146 
 
(Aug. 9, 2019, 6:04 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-buttigieg/ 
democrat-buttigieg-unveils-healthcare-plan-for-rural-americans-tribes-idUSKCN1UZ15A. 
 143  See BIDEN FOR PRESIDENT, https://joebiden.com/healthcare/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2019). 
 144  Julie Rovner, Biden’s Health Play In A COVID-19 Economy: Lower Medicare’s Eligibility Age To 
60, NPR (Apr. 11, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020 
/04/11/832025550/bidens-health-play-in-a-covid-19-economy-lower-medicares-eligibility-
age-to-60. 
 145  STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 56 at 45-46 (States have resisted care for certain residents since 
the colonial period, relying on concepts of the deserving poor to refuse assistance to those 
deemed to be shirking the societal expectation of productivity); see generally Huberfeld & 
Roberts, supra note 7. 
 146  See generally Special Message from President Harry S. Truman to the Congress 
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A key question is whether the federal government has the power 
to address these policy desires. As this part shows, constitutional 
inquiry, political considerations, and policy complexity should be 
analytically separated to the degree possible. Perhaps, 
counterintuitively, a bill’s degree of disruption does not automatically 
correspond to its constitutionality. The most disruptive bills are more 
straightforward from a constitutional perspective because they 
exercise pure federal spending. Involving the states in health reform 
will complicate any legislative effort because the Court enforced new 
limits on conditional federal spending in NFIB v. Sebelius, which 
cabined a mechanism that Congress has long used to influence state 
participation in federal policies (with the imprimatur of the Court).147 
This part addresses these questions, including issues that could arise 
from funding health reform with a “wealth tax.” 
 
A. Reliance on Spending Power  
Many of the current bills would have Congress construct a federal 
spending program that operates as a new kind of public health 
insurance or that builds on Medicare by expanding eligibility. Either 
way, Congress would be spending federal money in crafting a national 
program, which would be an exercise of the power enumerated in the 
Spending Clause (sometimes called the “General Welfare Clause” and 
including the tax power too when so named) and spending for “the 
general welfare.”148 
The spending power is a broad source of authority for Congress, 
allowing it to enact laws that directly or indirectly establish national 
 
Recommending a Comprehensive Health Program (Nov. 19, 1945) (available at 
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/ document/special-message-to-the-congress-
recommending-a-comprehensive-health-program/). 
 147  For example, in New York v. US, the Court approved federal use of the spending power to 
influence state policymaking and differentiated use of money to influence state choices from 
the impermissible commands to states to act. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158, 
167 (1992) (holding that Congress lacks power to force states to implement certain federally 
mandated regulations but can exercise the spending power to influence state law). 
 148  “Congress shall have power to … provide for …the general welfare of the United States….”. 
U.S. CONST. art. I §  8 cl. 1. This is referred to as the General Welfare Clause— the taxing power 
and the spending power. 
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policy through federal money.149 Congress can establish federal 
programs that are run by the federal government (like Medicare), but 
Congress can also establish federal policy and then choose to invite 
state or private actors to participate in the national law (like Medicaid). 
When Congress spends, it can create conditions for participating in the 
federal program that are subject to a five-part test asking if: the 
spending is for the general welfare; the conditions are clear and 
unambiguous; the conditions are related to the purposes of the federal 
spending; the conditions are constitutional; and forbidding Congress 
from crossing from influence to coercion when asking states to take 
federal money.150 In other words, the Supreme Court has held that 
Congress is permitted to influence policymaking through federal 
spending but must adhere to the Court’s rules, which are meant to 
ensure that federal spending creates no surprises in the conditions 
imposed on the funds and does not indirectly violate constitutionally-
protected state or individual rights. 
National programs to improve the public’s health, provide access 
to medical care, or facilitate access through universal health insurance 
coverage surely constitute spending for the “general welfare.” Indeed, 
health care has been a congressional project since the American 
Revolution, with the federal government incrementally adding 
national money and standards when states and markets fail.151 
Paradoxically, the Supreme Court has interpreted congressional 
constitutional authority broadly enough for Congress to create a 
national health insurance program since the Great Depression,152 but it 
has not been a political possibility, underscoring that constitutional 
authority and political will are not the same. 
 
 149  United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1936) (“the power of Congress to authorize 
expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of 
legislative power found in the Constitution…. the powers of taxation and appropriation 
extend only to matters of national, as distinguished from local, welfare.”). 
 150  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); Arlington Central School District 
Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); 
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).  
 151  Gluck & Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?, supra note 18, at 1706-19. 
 152  See generally United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) 
(commonly cited for the proposition that Congress can exercise the commerce power to 
regulate the national insurance market. This would also include health insurance.); see 
generally Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937). 
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An example of peak General Welfare Clause power is Medicare, 
which has long been accepted, even lauded, as a national program that 
serves the general welfare.153 Structurally, Medicare is a purely federal 
spending program, taxing payrolls to providing federal money and 
programmatic rules  ̶ with no role for states.  Medicare bypassed the 
call for protecting states’ rights in health care policy due to the elderly 
successfully convincing members of Congress that the unpredictable 
nature of state politics and budgeting were too dangerous for the 
elderly and their families.154 The conditions Medicare places on federal 
funds – such as establishing rules for program participation, 
preventing fraud and abuse, creating algorithms for payment of 
benefits delivered, and the like – are established by the federal 
government and act on private parties. Those private parties include 
the health care providers who participate in, and are paid by, 
Medicare, the private insurance carriers who act as regional 
administrators, and the beneficiaries enrolled in the program. So long 
as Congress and HHS act reasonably in establishing rules for 
Medicare, and play by the rules created,155 Medicare operates on a long 
constitutional leash. Medicare does have a federalist structure, as 
private health insurance companies have contracts with HHS to 
 
 153  The constitutionality of the Social Security Act, which was amended in 1965 to include 
Medicare, was at issue in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (unemployment 
benefits), and Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (old age benefits). The Supreme Court 
upheld the SSA in these decisions, recognizing a demonstrated need for collective action at 
the federal level and declaring the Hamiltonian (broad) view of the spending power as a 
separate enumerated power for Congress to be the settled interpretation. See Steward Machine 
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 578, 599 (1937); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 640, 646 (1937). The Court 
also dismissed arguments that providing welfare to the elderly was reserved to the states. 
Helvering at 640-45. Emphasizing that the nation’s industrialization was relevant to 
understanding congressional lawmaking, the Court wrote: “The problem is plainly national 
in area and dimensions. Moreover, laws of the separate states cannot deal with it effectively. 
Congress, at least, had a basis for that belief. States and local governments are often lacking 
in the resources that are necessary to finance an adequate program of security for the aged.” 
Id. at 644. 
 154  STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 56, at 45; Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 112, at 449. 
 155  See, e.g., Azar v. Allina Health Services, 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1808 (2019) (“One way or another, 
Medicare touches the lives of nearly all Americans. Recognizing this reality, Congress has 
told the government that, when it wishes to establish or change a “substantive legal standard” 
affecting Medicare benefits, it must first afford the public notice and a chance to comment. 42 
U.S.C. §1395hh(a)(2).”). 
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administer the program on a regional level, but this is not classic 
American federalism, as states have no role. 
A proposal for federal, public health insurance that covers the 
entire population (“single payer”) in a form consistent with M4A bills 
would likely parallel Medicare’s constitutional, governance, and 
structural path. Providing health insurance through tax revenue 
redistribution is within Congress’s authority to spend for the general 
welfare, a political decision that the Court has left to the discretion of 
Congress.156 Congress’s ability to spend on this scale is relatively recent 
and tied to the Sixteenth Amendment, which allowed a federal income 
tax that freed Congress to spend in ways that could not have occurred 
before 1913.157 The Sixteenth Amendment’s timing helps to explain 
why the spending power was not defined through judicial analysis 
until 1936158 (unlike the commerce power, the heart of one of the 
Supreme Court’s first major opinions159). Accordingly, the first earnest 
push for national health insurance occurred when the Social Security 
Act was drafted.160 The proposal was defeated quickly by the 
American Medical Association and Southern Democrats, who refused 
to open the door to the federal government lest it intervene in the 
segregation and suppression of African-American citizens, especially 
agricultural and domestic workers.161 Federal health insurance was 
feared as a wedge through which desegregation could occur.162 The 
 
 156  South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–641 
(1937) (“In considering whether a particular expenditure is intended to serve general public 
purposes, courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress.”). 
 157  U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. The Sixteenth Amendment exists in part because Prohibition 
significantly depleted federal tax revenue, as the federal sales tax on alcohol was a top source 
of federal tax revenue. See PROHIBITION (Florentine Films & WETA 2011) (available at 
https://www.pbs.org/kenburns/prohibition). It was also enacted to refute the Pollock decision 
by the Supreme Court, which struck down a federal income tax, discussed below.  
 158  See generally U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (first Supreme Court decision analyzing the 
nature of the spending power and holding spending is a plenary power rather than 
modifying the other enumerated powers in Article I section 8). 
 159  See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (analyzing the nature of the commerce power 
as plenary in nature and not limited by the existence of state police power). 
 160  Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 112. 
 161  Nicole Huberfeld, Federalism in Health Care Reform, HOLES IN THE SAFETY NET: FEDERALISM 
AND POVERTY 202 (Ezra Rosser, ed. 2019). 
 162  They were not wrong; Medicare desegregated hospitals when it was enacted in 1965 because 
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international embarrassment of having many elderly live in poverty 
and their families penurious for trying to provide medical care, the 
effective Kennedy/Johnson War on Poverty, and repeated failed 
attempts at pushing medical welfare to the states, made it so that social 
insurance for medical care became politically feasible in 1965.  
Medicare has been on secure constitutional footing because this law 
provides medical care to the elderly through a payroll tax built on the 
Social Security Act, which was the product of New Deal era decisions 
upholding federal laws that created new baselines in social 
programming and redistributive policy.163 
One exception to the solid constitutional footing of single payer 
may be hidden within Warren’s M4A payment plan, which seeks to 
claim money from the states to pay for a national single payer 
program. A lesson lies hidden in Medicare Part D. There, Congress 
created a new pharmaceutical drug benefit that assumed 
responsibility of drug costs for seniors, including dual eligibles (those 
who are both poor and elderly, thus enrolled in both Medicare and 
Medicaid). Drug coverage is a comfortable exercise of the spending 
power in providing for the general welfare of seniors, but Part D asked 
states to pay for part of dual eligibles’ drug benefit to continue to 
participate in Medicaid.164 This “clawback” also allowed HHS to 
withhold Medicaid funding if a state failed to pay.165 States challenged 
the clawback as violating intergovernmental tax immunity and 
implicating anti-commandeering principles, but the Supreme Court 
denied their petition for original jurisdiction, and the states walked 
away from the litigation.166 States argued they could not refuse to pay 
 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prevented federal funds from being used in segregated settings. 
WENDY MARINER, GEORGE ANNAS, NICOLE HUBERFELD & MICHAEL ULRICH, PUBLIC HEALTH 
LAW 236-37 (3d ed. 2019); see also DAVID BARTON SMITH, THE POWER TO HEAL: CIVIL RIGHTS, 
MEDICARE, AND THE STRUGGLE TO TRANSFORM AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (VAND. U. 
Press, ed. 2016). 
 163  For a historical perspective on congressional authority to enact the SSA, see Larry DeWitt, 
The 1937 Supreme Court Rulings on the Social Security Act, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/history/court.html (last visited May 24, 2019). 
 164   42 U.S.C.A. § 1396u-5 (c)(1)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-140) (effective Dec. 20, 
2019). 
 165  42 U.S.C.A. § 1396u-5 (c)(1)(C) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-140) (effective Dec. 20, 
2019). 
 166  Texas v. Leavitt, 547 U.S. 1204 (2006) (mem.); Brief of Professors and Practitioners of Health 
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the clawback because HHS could withhold Medicaid funds and 
claimed they could not anticipate this condition on Medicaid funding, 
raising conditional spending questions that foreshadowed arguments 
in NFIB v. Sebelius.167 States have benefitted from Part D and never 
returned to these claims, which were novel at the time. But, after NFIB, 
these theories could have more traction. 
While single payer programs modeled after Medicare would be 
straightforward spending for the general welfare, a more difficult 
constitutional question arises if, as Senator Sanders has asserted, 
private insurance would be outlawed. The insurance market is long 
acknowledged to be within Congress’s power to regulate interstate 
commerce under the Commerce Clause.168 Congress gave the work of 
regulating insurance back to the states in 1945 by enacting the 
 
Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs, Texas v. Leavitt, 547 U.S. 1204 (2006) (mem.) 
(No. 135) (explaining constitutional issues with the Part D clawback). See also Elizabeth 
Weeks, Cooperative Federalism and Healthcare Reform: The Medicare Part D “Clawback” Example, 
1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 79, 120 (2008) (describing the states’ litigation and theories 
of the litigation); Nicole Huberfeld, Clear Notice for Conditions on Spending, Unclear Implications 
for States in Federal Healthcare Programs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 441, 445 (2008) (assessing the 
constitutionality of the clawback and finding it questionable). 
 167  See Nicole Huberfeld, Clear Notice for Conditions on Spending, Unclear Implications for States in 
Federal Healthcare Programs, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 441, 482 (2008). 
 168  United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 552-53, 561-62 (1944). Justice 
Black wrote: “Perhaps no modern commercial enterprise directly affects so many persons in 
all walks of life as does the insurance business. Insurance touches the home, the family, and 
the occupation or the business of almost every person in the United States.” Id. at 540. The 
Court tackled Lochner era decisions that led the district court to conclude that the act of 
making an insurance contract is local and not subject to federal authority, finding that 
insurance companies – even in 1944 – were largely located in a few metropolitan centers (the 
five largest were located in New York City) and acted in a nationwide manner to use the 
money from all of the contracts of all of the individuals paying for insurance to create one 
risk pool for themselves, which was an indisputable web of interstate commerce according to 
the Court. The decision stated: 
Our basic responsibility in interpreting the Commerce Clause is to make 
certain that the power to govern intercourse among the states remains where the 
Constitution placed it. That power, as held by this Court from the beginning, is 
vested in the Congress, available to be exercised for the national welfare as 
Congress shall deem necessary. No commercial enterprise of any kind which 
conducts its activities across state lines has been held to be wholly beyond the 
regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. We cannot make an 
exception of the business of insurance.  
Id. at 552-52.  
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McCarran-Ferguson Act.169 This default approach of including states 
in health policy carried through to grant-in-aid programs, which 
morphed into Medicaid and maintained states’ historical role in social 
programs. This later carried through to ERISA, which preempted state 
laws pertaining to employment benefits, but saved regulation of the 
business of insurance for states.170 To be clear, these preservations of 
state power are not constitutionally required; rather, they are 
legislative choices and exist by the “grace” of Congress.171 If Congress 
wants to regulate insurance, it has constitutional authority to do so, 
but it may be necessary to rescind parts of McCarran-Ferguson, or at 
least reconcile concurrent regulation. Also, the nature and scope of a 
new insurance market regulation is key because Congress does not 
have totally unfettered power to regulate insurance. 
In 2012, when the Supreme Court refused to recognize the ACA’s 
minimum essential coverage provision (the “individual mandate”) as 
an exercise of commerce power to regulate the entire health care 
market nationwide, the Court restricted Congress’s power over 
insurance markets to some degree.172 The Court upheld the individual 
mandate as an exercise of the taxing power, reading the ACA not as a 
law requiring purchase of insurance but one penalizing failure to have 
insurance coverage.173 This novel limitation on Congress’s commerce 
 
 169  McCarran Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C.A §§1011-1015 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116–140). 
 170  Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Pub. L. No. 93–406, § 514(b)(2)(A) (1974). 
 171  Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of 
Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L. J. 534, 542 (2011) (describing state 
authority within federal statutory federalism structures as existing by the “grace of 
Congress”). 
 172  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (Chief Justice Roberts wrote for 
himself alone on this point, but the Joint Dissent agreed in principle that the individual 
mandate was not a proper exercise of the commerce power because Congress cannot force 
individuals to participate in a commercial market). 
 173  This interpretation is now at stake in litigation attempting to eliminate the ACA as wholly 
unconstitutional in the wake of Congress zeroing out the penalty for the individual mandate 
at the end of 2017. Texas v. United States, 340 F.Supp.3d 579  (N.D. TX., 2018) aff’d, 945 F.3d 355 
(5th Cir., 2019), reh’g denied en banc, 949 F.3d 182 (5th Cir., 2020) cert. granted, sub nom. 
California v. Texas, 140 S.Ct. 1262 (Mar. 2, 2020); see also Nicole Huberfeld, Texas v. U.S.: 
Another Day, Another Threat to the Affordable Care Act, AM. CONST. SOC’Y BLOG (July 18, 2019), 
https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/texas-v-u-s-another-day-another-threat-to-the-aca/ 
(detailing the history and context of the case in light of the 5th Circuit oral arguments); see 
generally Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–97 (2017) (zeroing out the penalty for 
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power could affect analysis of a plan to outlaw private insurance as 
part of a single-payer program. The Court has held that Congress can 
outlaw products to be able to suppress or eradicate an illegal market, 
such as illicit drugs.174 While health insurance has been regulated by 
federal and state governments (sometimes heavily), it has not been 
labeled an illegal product. If Congress were to outlaw private 
insurance to further a Medicare for All program, a legitimate reason to 
outlaw a longstanding legal product should exist and would likely be 
evaluated under the Lopez rubric.175 No question exists as to whether 
Congress can regulate insurance; the issue would be whether Congress 
can eradicate private insurance. It is conceivable that legislative 
findings could point to features such as the steep cost of private 
insurance combined with practices designed to exclude undesirable 
subscribers from coverage, even after heavy regulatory action such as 
the ACA.176 Congress would have an uphill battle justifying a decision 
to outlaw private insurance, and litigation would predictably ensue. 
Limiting private insurance is just one possibility to configuring a 
single payer system. At least three mechanisms already exist. First, 
Medicare permits but regulates private insurers to sell Medigap 
coverage to beneficiaries, relying in part on states to regulate these 
supplemental insurance carriers through licensure and other usual 
insurance regulations.177 Medicare proscribes types of plans and 
available benefits, so they supplement but do not compete with 
 
failure to have insurance coverage). 
 174  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (example of the Controlled Substances Act as a permitted 
exercise the commerce power to outlaw all uses of marijuana, even medical use when the 
plants are grown in the backyard of a disabled patient who meets the terms of a state law 
allowing medical use). 
 175  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Congress can regulate channels of interstate 
commerce, instrumentalities of or persons or things traveling in interstate commerce, and 
those activities with a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 
 176  For example, insurers still try to sidestep mental health parity rules. See Graison Dangor, 
‘Mental Health Parity’ Is Still An Elusive Goal In U.S. Insurance Coverage, NPR (June 7, 2019, 5:00 
AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/ health-shots/2019/06/07/730404539/mental-health-
parity-is-still-an-elusive-goal-in-u-s-insurance-coverage.  
 177  Cristina Boccuti et al., Medicare Enrollment and Consumer Protections Vary Across States, KAISER 
FAM. FOUND. (July 11, 2018), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/medigap-enrollment-
and-consumer-protections-vary-across-states/. 
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Medicare coverage.178 Medigap is big business, not as large as ESI and 
other private insurance markets, but not minimal either.179 Notably, 
this kind of supplementary private insurance market exists in other 
nations with single-payer systems, such as Canada and many 
European nations.180 Second, Congress could invite private insurers to 
administer a single-payer program, effectively continuing the 
longstanding Medicare Administrative Contractor approach, which 
relies on private insurers to administer sub-national regions of the 
Medicare program.181 This choice would include and specify a role for 
private insurers without outlawing them. A third possibility is that 
Congress could reject the Medicare Administrative Contractor 
approach, eliminating private insurers from administrative roles in a 
national program but permitting and regulating any new 
supplementary insurance markets. All of these approaches would be 
more likely to pass constitutional muster than outlawing private 
insurance outright, as they are more directly encompassed in 
Congress’s spending power and the flexibility that authority affords 
for including or excluding private entities from a spending law. 
 
B. Federalism’s Complications 
The governance structure of any of the possible spending 
programs – M4A, public option, or other - cannot be overlooked. The 
discussion above focuses on a pure federal spending program like 
Medicare, which is more straightforward, both constitutionally 
 
 178  42 U.S.C. § 1395ss (2015) (effective Jan. 3, 2016); see also What’s Medicare Supplement Insurance 
(Medigap)?, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.medicare.gov/ 
supplements-other-insurance/whats-medicare-supplement-insurance-medigap (last visited 
May 25, 2020) (explaining basic features of Medigap for the public). 
 179  See, e.g., Pa. McMurray, Mark Farrah Associates Reports Year-over-year Medicare Supplement 
Market Growth of 3.8%, BUS. WIRE (May 29, 2018, 10:11 AM), https://www 
.businesswire.com/news/home/20180529005111/en/Mark-FarrahAssociates-Reports-Year-
over-year-Medicare-Supplement (reporting Medigap carriers “earned $29.9 billion in 
premiums and paid out $23.2 billion in claims during 2017.” Also reporting “Medicare 
Supplement plans collectively earned approximately $31.3 billion in premiums and paid out 
$24.7 billion in claims during 2018”). 
 180  See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, Private health insurance exists in Europe and Canada. Here’s how it works., 
VOX (Feb. 12, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/health-care/2019/2/12/18215430/ single-
payer-private-health-insurance-harris-sanders. 
 181  42 U.S.C. § 1395kk–1 (2010) (effective Jan. 7, 2011); 42 C.F.R. § 421 (2009). 
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speaking and administratively, than a conditional spending program 
like Medicaid, which invites state participation in addition to acting on 
private entities. The layer of state governance makes for a much more 
complex constitutional calculus. 
The Court established a test for conditional spending in South 
Dakota v. Dole, yet no decision applied the Tenth Amendment as a 
limiting principle on the spending power, even during the Rehnquist 
Court’s federalism revolution, until NFIB v. Sebelius. In contrast to 
decisions like Lopez, which established a more restrictive analysis for 
congressional exercises of the commerce power, the spending power 
bothered certain Justices for having no analytical limits in the name of 
protecting state police power under the Tenth Amendment.182 During 
the Rehnquist federalism revolution, Justice Kennedy lamented that 
the commerce power was being limited by the Tenth Amendment, but 
the spending power was not, and he warned that the spending power 
would be an end-run around limitations on commerce power.183 The 
path changed in 2012, with NFIB v. Sebelius, when the Supreme Court 
held that an exercise of the spending power could be 
unconstitutionally coercive.184 Though the Chief Justice’s opinion for 
the plurality did not cite the Tenth Amendment in the coercion 
analysis, federalism is the soul of that decision.185 Medicaid expansion 
was vulnerable to challenge because states were invited to co-
administer two key features of the ACA, which opened federalism 
questions that had been asked in other litigation but never answered 
by the Court.186  
 
 182  Nicole Huberfeld, Clear Notice for Conditions on Spending, supra note 166, at 452 n. 46, 454–55 
(describing Justice Kennedy’s desire to limit the spending power by applying the Tenth 
Amendment in the same way as the commerce power was limited); see also Nicole Huberfeld, 
Elizabeth Weeks & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid  and  Coercion  
in  National  Federation  of  Independent  Business  v.  Sebelius,  93  B.U. L. REV. 1, 4–6, 47-50 (2013) 
(explaining why it was unsurprising that the Court addressed the spending power and 
boosted the coercion doctrine in NFIB). 
 183  See Nicole Huberfeld, supra note 166; see also Gluck & Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in 
Healthcare For?, supra note 18, at 1729 n. 193. 
 184  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 185  See generally Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties, supra note 182, at 46–50. 
 186  Id.  
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Medicaid has been described as a “classic” cooperative federalism 
program, meaning that the statute offers money to states to implement 
federal policy, but the program could not exist in a state that does not 
accept federal funding. All states have participated in Medicaid since 
1982, which Congress knew when it made Medicaid expansion a 
mandatory element of the ACA’s comprehensive insurance 
overhaul.187 Congress also must have been aware that states readily 
accepted other expansions of Medicaid eligibility over time.188 The 
ACA effected a similar expansion, wherein states were tasked with a 
mandatory expansion of Medicaid eligibility to nonelderly, childless 
adults regardless of other qualifying characteristics, intentionally 
including all of the nation’s poor in Medicaid eligibility for the first 
time.189 
A plurality of the Court (seven Justices had points of agreement, 
counting the joint dissent) agreed that Congress could not force 
(“coerce”) states to expand Medicaid at the risk of losing all existing 
Medicaid funding. The plurality did not analyze Medicaid expansion 
in a straightforward fashion, i.e. by applying the four-part Dole test, 
and refused to create a rule for coercion. Rather, the Court decided that 
Medicaid expansion appeared too different from the Medicaid 
program that pre-dated the ACA; states could not have anticipated this 
kind of expansion of eligibility; and the threat of losing federal funding 
for the second largest item in states’ budgets was a step too close to 
federal influence becoming coercion, calling expansion a “gun to the 
head” of states.190 Roberts’ opinion appeared to rely on the Dole 
principles of clear notice and germaneness, and added a fifth element 
of coercion (which had been dicta) to the Dole test.191 In dissent, Justice 
Ginsburg argued that Congress operated well within its spending 
power to create Medicaid and to expand eligibility, and the ACA’s 
expansion of Medicaid was no different than if Congress repealed 
Medicaid and re-enacted it as written in the ACA.192 Would a 
 
 187  Id. 
 188  Id. 
 189  Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 112, at 450. 
 190  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 581 (2012). 
 191  Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties, supra note 182, at 6, 46, 50-71. 
 192  See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 634 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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“ritualistic” rescission and enactment be required for Medicare for All, 
Medicare expansion, or public option bills?193 Surely not, though it 
may be a neater approach. 
NFIB tells us that expanding insurance coverage is not intrinsically 
problematic. The Court’s problem with Medicaid expansion was with 
Congress asking states to perform a national standard rather than 
using a purely federal approach. In a single payer or public option 
program, states do not need to be involved from a constitutional 
perspective, and current bills largely do not include states. A notable 
exception is contained in the Sanders bill, which keeps states acting in 
a limited but important function: to run institutional long-term care 
through a whittled down Medicaid program. States are already 
responsible for long-term care through Medicaid, which covers nearly 
two-thirds of all long-term services and supports.194 A single-payer 
law initiating drastic reduction in eligibility, benefits, and other 
aspects of the Medicaid program would not negatively affect states in 
an obvious fashion, except to remove policy decisions from state 
politics and to reduce federal money that can be moved around in state 
budgets.195 States do not have legal claims on such changes.196 States 
are entitled to Medicaid funding under existing law, but they do not 
have formal power over federal funding decisions.197 And, while the 
NFIB decision made it clear that states must be able to reject federal 
funds, the coercion doctrine (such as it is) does not constrain 
 
 193  Id. 
 194  U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION, OFF. 
DISABILITY, AGING & LONG-TERM CARE POL’Y, AN OVERVIEW OF LONG-TERM SERVICES AND 
SUPPORTS AND MEDICAID: FINAL REPORT 14 (2018), https://aspe.hhs.gov/pdf-report/overview-
long-term-services-and-supports-and-medicaid-final-report. 
 195  States are notorious for misusing federal funding, which is in part the reason that Medicaid 
itself became a federal program with spending conditions morphed from a less constrained 
‘grant in aid’ program.  
 196  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 630–31 (2012). 
 197  42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1996) (effective Jan. 6, 1997) (“the Secretary … shall pay to each State…”). 
This is the root of the legal problem with the Trump administration’s proposed block grants. 
See Rachel Sachs & Nicole Huberfeld, The Problematic Law And Policy Of Medicaid Block Grants, 
HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (July 24, 2019), https://www. healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog 
20190722.62519/full/; Nicole Huberfeld, Medicaid block grants would gut law and cut care, THE 
HILL (Jan. 31, 2020, 1:30 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/480860-medicaid-block-
grants-would-gut-law-and-cut-care. 
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Congress’s ability to change direction with federal policy.198 Under the 
Sanders bill, no new state-based responsibility for spending replaces 
the largely eliminated Medicaid program. States like receiving 
Medicaid’s generous federal money and have found many ways to use 
and divert it over time, but it would be difficult for states to protest so 
long as they continue to receive adequate federal funds for long-term 
care. 
The DeLauro bill, “Medicare for America,” is more 
constitutionally complicated because it keeps states in the health care 
governance game by having state Medicaid agencies run enrollment 
for Medicare expansion. The Court has held that treating the states like 
federal administrators may be deemed impermissible 
commandeering, like when Congress asked states to administer 
background checks for firearms purchases.199 But, if Medicare for 
America offers money to states for administering new enrollment 
(much in the way that HHS currently pays for states’ Medicaid 
administrative costs), and states can opt out with a federal backstop 
(like the ACA’s exchanges), then this structure could be 
constitutionally permissible. 
The State Public Option Act also suffers from federalism 
complications. While a Medicaid model for health reform should keep 
federalism enthusiasts happy because states retain a key role, it also 
raises flags for the federalism issues elevated in NFIB v. Sebelius. The 
federalism key to the ACA’s governance structure has demonstrated 
that states are effective at negotiating for their policy preferences 
within a federal statutory scheme, which is a plus for federalism unto 
itself. But, federalism’s divided governance is not the optimal 
approach for a program meant to cover populations universally or 
uniformly or equitably, principles that help strengthen social 
programs and to simplify them administratively.200 
 
 198  As Justice Ginsburg stated, states do not have a right to federal money, unless a statute makes 
it so (Medicaid is a statutory entitlement for states and beneficiaries).  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. 
v. Sebelius v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (Ginsburg, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 199  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 200  See Theda Skocpol, Targeting within Universalism: Politically Viable Policies to Combat Poverty in 
the United States, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 411 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 
1991). 
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The bottom line is that choosing federalism in health reform 
governance is a predictably complicating factor. This is true 
constitutionally and for implementing health policy. As Abbe Gluck 
and I have concluded, federalism enables political expediency for 
negotiating new laws and policies, and it facilitates state sovereign 
acts; but, it is less clear whether federalism serves health policy goals 
in any consistent fashion.201 Rather, federalism is a predictable trade-
off, leading to variability in the implementation of national policy 
goals that sometimes dips below the national baseline. This variability 
is not inherently good or desirable, despite classic federalism tropes 
expressing the value of “experimentation,” and needs to be studied 
much more thoroughly.  
C. The Wealth Tax Question 
A different complication may exist with a method proposed to 
fund expanded public health insurance: a “wealth tax.” A wealth tax 
could raise questions about the meaning of the “direct tax” limitation 
on Congress’s broad taxing power.202 Under typical proposals, a tax 
would be imposed on total assets, or net worth, creating a new way to 
regularly collect tax revenue.203 For example, Senator Warren 
proposed to tax “All household assets … including residences, closely 
held businesses, assets held in trust, retirement assets, assets held by 
minor children, and personal property with a value of $50,000 or 
more” and a “2% annual tax on household net worth between $50 
million and $1 billion and a 4% annual Billionaire Surtax (6% tax 
overall) on household net worth above $1 billion.”204 This “Ultra-
 
 201  Gluck & Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?, supra note 18, at 1784–95. 
 202  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3; id. at § 9, cl. 4; see, e.g., Kyle Sammin, Here’s Why Elizabeth Warren’s 
Wealth Tax Is Completely Unconstitutional, THE FEDERALIST (Aug. 8, 2019), 
https://thefederalist.com/2019/08/08/heres-elizabeth-warrens-wealth-tax-completely-
unconstitutional/ (arguing a wealth tax is a direct tax); cf. JOHN R. BROOKS & DAVID GAMAGE, 
WHY A WEALTH TAX IS DEFINITELY CONSTITUTIONAL (2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract 
=3518506. 
 203  For a dissection of approaches to a wealth tax and possible pitfalls, see Miranda Perry 
Fleischer, Not So Fast: The Hidden Difficulties of Taxing Wealth, in WEALTH: NOMOS LVIII 261 
(Jack Knight ed., 2017). 
 204  Ultra-Millionaire Tax, WARREN DEMOCRATS, https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/ultra-
millionaire-tax (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). 
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Millionaire Tax” would be paid in addition to other tax obligations. 
Likewise, candidate Tom Steyer supported a wealth tax, proposing: 
“anyone worth 32 million dollars or more will pay 1 cent more on the 
dollar. At 500 million, that goes up to 1 and a half cents. And at 1 billion 
dollars, that number hits 2 cents. Over a decade, that’s 1.7 trillion 
dollars in tax revenue — which will go towards things like fixing 
health care….”205 
A wealth tax is different from the constitutionally-sanctioned  
federal income tax,206 as it addresses the fact that not all households 
accumulate personal wealth through wages. Some hold real estate, 
business resources such as stocks, or other property that is not the 
usual work-based payment subject to annual income tax accounting 
but, rather, derives from assets that are taxed upon specified events 
such as sale of the asset or death of an asset holder (e.g., estate taxes). 
These are far from the first proposals to raise questions about the 
Direct Tax Clauses. For example, a tax on horse carriages created the 
first Supreme Court ruling on this issue, Hylton v. U.S., in 1796.207 More 
recently, during the 1996 presidential election, flat tax proposals to 
reform the Internal Revenue Code reawakened the question of what 
constitutes a “direct tax.”208 In the following presidential campaign 
cycle, Donald Trump proposed a wealth tax on those with net worth 
above $10 million, believing such a tax could eliminate the national 
deficit.209 None of these proposals came to fruition, and it is hard to say 
if a wealth tax would have traction now, but it is helpful to understand 
why this question arises as funding plans are discussed for health 
reform proposals. 
 
 205  We Need a Wealth Tax, TOM 2020, https://2020.tomsteyer.com/wealth-tax/ (last visited Jan. 13, 
2020). 
 206  U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 207  Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796). 
 208  See, e.g., Arlen Specter, How a Flat Tax Can Be Middle-Class Friendly, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 1995), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/18/opinion/l-how-a-flat-tax-can-be-middle-class-
friendly-189095.html; Daniel Mitchell & William Beach, How the Armey-Shelby Flat Tax Would 
Affect the Middle Class, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 12, 1996), https://www.heritage.org 
/node/20613/print-display (discussing the Armey, Forbes, and other flat tax proposals). 
 209  Dawn Johnsen & Walter Dellinger, The Constitutionality of a National Wealth Tax, 93 IND. L. J. 
111, 112 (2018). 
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Three constitutional provisions are relevant to the debate: Article 
I, section 8 enumerates legislative powers, with the first clause stating 
that Congress “shall have power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts and Excises to pay the Debts and provide for the common 
Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”210 The General 
Welfare Clause exists because the Articles of Confederation 
demonstrated the impossible weakness of a central government that 
cannot raise its own revenue.211 So, Congress’s taxing power was 
written broadly, but it was worrisome to representatives of Southern 
states, which assumed slavery would be taxed out of existence. As 
such, an exception to the power to tax was written into Article I, section 
2, clause 2, and section 9 clause 4. These “Direct Tax Clauses” limit 
congressional authority as part of the “three-fifths compromise,” 
credited with keeping the Constitutional Convention on track by 
protecting slavery.212 The three-fifths compromise allowed slaves to be 
counted for purposes of apportioning the House of Representatives, 
which benefited Southern states but also made it so they could be taxed 
at higher rates if “direct taxes” on property or people were imposed 
because of their large enslaved populations.213 Section 9, clause 4 
states, “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in 
Proportion to the Census or enumeration herein before directed to be 
taken.”214 So, taxes are to be uniform across the nation, unless they are 
deemed direct, in which case they are to be apportioned according to 
the census. 
Professor Ackerman argued before the current health reform 
debate that the first, narrow, Supreme Court decision, Hylton, is the 
correct interpretation of the Direct Tax Clauses because the clauses 
were meant to limit congressional authority regarding slavery and did 
 
 210  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 211  States were to provide revenue by taxing their residents, but no recourse existed when they 
refused to comply. See generally Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1 (1999) (exploring the history of wealth taxes and the meaning of the apportionment 
provisions in the Constitution). 
 212  Id. at 9-13. 
 213  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. This fear was reflected too in U.S. CONST art. I, § 9, c1. 1, which limited 
import taxes on each enslaved person to $10.  
 214  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
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not to speak to taxing mechanisms writ large.215 He and other scholars 
note that the direct tax language was neither fully understood nor 
explained by the Framers.216 Scholars argue that Hylton speaks with the 
Framers’ voices because the Court’s opinions were written by justices 
who happened to be three constitutional convention delegates and one 
state ratifier.217 Also, relevant to the narrow interpretation argument is 
the Thirteenth Amendment, which eradicated the three-fifths clause, 
and the Fourteenth Amendment, which rendered freed slaves citizens 
(and whole persons) and thus affected apportionment.218 The 
Reconstruction Amendments did not specifically amend the Direct 
Tax Clauses, so the question remained as to what constitutes a direct 
tax and whether apportionment was required.  
Early in the Lochner Era, the Court issued a broader interpretation 
of the Direct Tax Clauses, holding in Pollock that income tax is a direct 
tax.219 The Sixteenth Amendment reversed the Pollock decision, and 
reverted the Court to a narrow view of the Direct Tax Clauses, but did 
not directly address Pollock’s treatment of a tax on bonds as a direct 
tax.220  
In NFIB, the Court was asked to declare the shared responsibility 
payment for the minimum essential coverage provision (the tax 
penalty for the “individual mandate”) an impermissible direct tax. In 
rejecting the argument, Chief Justice Roberts offered a quick tour of 
the direct tax and noted, “Even when the Direct Tax Clause was 
 
 215  Ackerman, supra note 211, at 51–55; see also Johnsen & Dellinger, supra note 209, at 115; Calvin 
H. Johnson, A Wealth Tax Is Constitutional, A.B.A. TAX TIMES (Aug. 8, 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/taxation/publications/abataxtimes_home/19aug/19au
g-pp-johnson-a-wealth-tax-is-constitutional/. 
 216  Ackerman, supra note 211, at 11. (“The delegates’ desire to evade divisive theoretical debate 
became even clearer when the basic clause linking representation and ‘direct taxation’ 
returned to the floor on August 20: ‘Mr. King asked what was the precise meaning of direct 
taxation? No one answered.’”); see also Johnsen & Dellinger, supra note 209, at 118 (both 
quoting Madison’s notes from the convention). 
 217 See Ackerman, supra note 211, at 21; Johnsen & Dellinger, supra note 209, at 122–24. A counter 
narrative is that the early Supreme Court was weak and would not have struck down this 
important new congressional power. See also Sammin, supra note 202. 
 218  Ackerman, supra note 211. 
 219  Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan 
& Trust Co. (Pollock II), 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895). 
 220  Ackerman, supra note 211, at 48. 
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written it was unclear what else, other than a capitation (also known 
as a “head tax” …), might be a direct tax.”221 Addressing Hylton’s 
narrow interpretation, Roberts wrote:  
The Court was unanimous, and those Justices who wrote opinions either 
directly asserted or strongly suggested that only two forms of taxation 
were direct: capitations and land taxes. That narrow view of what a 
direct tax might be persisted for a century. … In 1895, we expanded our 
interpretation to include taxes on personal property and income from 
personal property, in the course of striking down aspects of the federal 
income tax. Pollock. That result was overturned by the Sixteenth 
Amendment, although we continued to consider taxes on personal 
property to be direct taxes.222 
NFIB conveyed the common understanding that the direct tax 
exception should be read narrowly, with the Pollock case being an 
outlier and functionally overruled.  
In short, much debate yet little case law exists to explain the 
meaning of the requirement for apportionment for direct taxes. The 
few scholars to examine this question perceive little limitation on 
congressional taxing authority and argue these clauses should be read 
narrowly because of history and because the apportionment 
requirement leads to absurd results (explicitly rejected in Hylton).223 
Also, Pollock is widely considered to have lost precedential value 
because of the Sixteenth Amendment and being part of the Lochner Era 
decisions that were overruled in broad strokes during the New Deal 
and later.224 To the extent the Direct Tax Clauses could be applicable to 
a modern wealth tax plan, tax scholars argue that careful drafting 
makes compliance possible.225 What does the meager record mean for 
a wealth tax proposal now? Litigation, to be sure. 
*** 
 
 221  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 570 (citing Springer v. United States, 102 
U.S. 586, 596–598 (1881)). 
 222  Id. at 570–71(citing Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 618 (1895)). 
 223  See Johnsen & Dellinger, supra note 209, at 119 n. 37, for a helpful rundown of the scholars 
and tax experts who have addressed the direct tax clauses. 
 224  Lincoln Fed. Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal, 335 U.S. 525 (1949) (overruling Lochner 
explicitly). 
 225  See generally Brooks & Gamage, supra note 202; Miranda Perry Fleischer, supra note 203. 
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Involving states in health reform could open a national policy 
effort to constitutional as well as implementation challenges, a hard-
won lesson from the ACA.226 But, even without state participation, 
other complicating factors exist. Constitutional clarity does not 
translate to political or policy action. If anything, the bigger the 
disruption, the greater the chances of a constitutional exercise of 
congressional power  ̶  and the lower the chances of political success  ̶  
an inverse relationship, at least before early 2020 (pre-Covid-19). Many 
knowledgeable stakeholders, including prior Obama administration 
officials who were deeply involved in negotiating and implementing 
the ACA, have stated that Medicare for All is a good idea but not a 
realistic goal.227 Some assert that the ACA is the right hybrid and 
worthy of fortification, reasoning that a public/private approach 
makes sense, and offering reasoning such as American historical 
reliance on private actors in health care.228 Some reason M4A is not 
politically feasible given how big the fight over the ACA was and 
continues to be. And, some think a federal single-payer approach 
could overlook important flexibilities built into Medicaid for poor 
populations.229 
IV. Assessing the Gestalt 
So what was behind the cry for health reform as the ACA passed 
its tenth signing anniversary? The call for reform that grew in 2019 
seemed surprisingly intense given that the ACA’s key elements did 
not begin implementation until January 1, 2014.230 The circus of 
 
 226  See generally Gluck & Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?, supra note 18; see also 
Gluck & Huberfeld, Federalism under the ACA, supra note 8. 
 227  The ACA at 10, SOLOMON CTR.  HEALTH L. & POL’Y AT YALE L. SCH., https://law.yale.edu 
/solomon-center/events/affordable-care-act-10 (last visited Mar. 15, 2020). Many Obama 
officials and stakeholders stated this sentiment during their remarks at this conference. 
 228  Gluck & Huberfeld, Federalism under the ACA, supra note 8. 
 229  See, e.g., Sara Rosenbaum & Stephen Warnke, Opinion: Even with ‘Medicare for all,’ we’ll still 
need Medicaid, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com 
/opinion/story/2019-09-11/medicare-for-all-bernie-sanders-debate-medicaid-public-health; 
Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid’s Remarkable Endurance, PUB. HEALTH POST (Nov. 12, 2018), 
https://www.publichealthpost.org/research/medicaids-remarkable-endurance/. 
 230  Enactment occurred March 23, 2010, but the biggest implementation date – including 
Medicaid expansion, health insurance exchange operation, and other major regulatory 
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constant political fighting and public confusion is not the whole story, 
because on the other hand, conversation and grassroots support have 
surged, evidenced by pushback against the 2017 efforts to repeal the 
ACA and continued calls to make the system more accessible, less 
expensive, and simpler. To decipher why the ACA is under a new 
microscope, this paper has explored the basic features of major reform 
proposals and the kinds of constitutional questions that could arise. 
But what does the gestalt mean for future laws addressing health 
reform? Is the problem the ACA’s core conceptual features? 
Governance architecture? Or is it a bigger question of our societal 
capacity to achieve the basic goals of equitability, fairness, 
administrative simplicity, and lower costs? 
Part of the tumult may be related to the ACA’s structure, rather 
than its goals, a somewhat hidden piece of the puzzle. I have written 
elsewhere about the problems of accountability and public confusion 
that the law’s federalism structure engendered, in addition to the 
health policy questions that arise from using federalism as a tool of 
health reform.231 These issues were exacerbated by the flipped 
federalism of the law’s implementation, which made it so the law’s key 
features were never implemented as designed.232 Implementation 
through flipped federalism contributed not only to slow-moving 
Medicaid expansion but also to public confusion about the law and its 
impact, including whether it still exists. Despite weaknesses in 
implementation, the ACA has had measurable impact on low-income 
individuals, discussed in Part I, suggesting that the goals were not the 
problem.233 After all, measured on its own terms, the ACA’s goal of 
universal coverage has been successful in states that have not fought 
implementation of the law, yet public awareness of the ACA’s impact 
was fairly low until the threat of repeal occurred in 2017.  
 
features – was January 1, 2014. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L. No. 111–
148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended throughout U.S. Code). 
 231  See Gluck & Huberfeld, What is Federalism in Healthcare For?, supra note 18, at 1784–88; see also 
Epilogue, supra note 46. 
 232  Id. at 1724–30. 
 233  Jesse C. Baumgartner, Sarah R. Collins, David C. Radley, & Susan L. Hayes, How the Affordable 
Care Act Has Narrowed Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Access to Health Care, COMMONWEALTH 
FUND (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/2020/jan/how-ACA-
narrowed-racial-ethnic-disparities-access. 
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One goal the ACA did not tackle with any urgency or depth was 
the high cost of American medical care. A sense of outrage emerges in 
polling and in media reports that consistently points to the 
problematic cost of care.234 The high cost of care thwarts access, even 
for those who are insured.235 The political efforts to limit 
pharmaceutical costs and to end surprise billing, both seemingly 
popular across the aisle, have lost momentum, with surprise billing 
popping up in a variety of bills, possibly moving toward pushing 
responsibility for keeping costs down to patients through price 
transparency, but overall taking on only a small corner of the large 
problem of cost.236 For example, no proposal directly addresses waste 
in health care; some studies indicate that waste could be excised to find 
cost reductions in failure of care delivery and care coordination, 
overtreatment or low value care, pricing failure, fraud and abuse, and 
 
 234  Ashley Kirzinger, Bryan Wu & Mollyann Brodie, Kaiser Health Tracking Poll – February 2018: 
Health Care and the 2018 Midterms, Attitudes Towards Proposed Changes to Medicaid, KAISER FAM. 
FOUND. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/kaiser-health-
tracking-poll-february-2018-health-care-2018-midterms-proposed-changes-to-medicaid/ 
(reporting that Medicaid is “seen favorably” by the vast majority of those polled and that 
despite improved views of the ACA, many polled put the cost of care first in their list of 
concerns for the 2018 election). While the public remains skeptical that work requirements 
promote health and sees them as a cost cutting measure. See id. Politicians and administration 
officials claim work requirements promote “self sufficiency.” See, e.g., Audrey Dutton, Idaho 
Gov. Little signs bill to put work requirements on Medicaid expansion, IDAHO STATESMAN (April 9, 
2019), https://www.idahostatesman.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article 
2290 18249.html. But polls depend on the framing of the question. See JB Wogan, Do Americans 
Support Work Requirements? Depends on How You Ask., GOVERNING (Feb. 9, 2018), 
https://www.governing.com /topics/health-human-services/gov-work-requirements-cap-
toll-medicaid.html (cataloging poll responses to work requirement related questions). 
 235  See Sarah Kliff, “Am I a bad person?” Why one mom didn’t take her kid to the ER — even after 
poison control said to., VOX (May 10, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/health-
care/2019/5/10/18526696/health-care-costs-er-emergency-room; Gary Claxton et al., How does 
cost affect access to care?, PETERSON KAISER HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Jan. 22, 2019), 
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/cost-affect-access-care/. 
 236  See, e.g., Dan Diamond, Congress’ effort on surprise medical bills is flagging, POLITICO PULSE 
(Sept. 10, 2019, 10 AM), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-pulse/2019/09 
/10/congress-effort-on-surprise-medical-bills-is-flagging-735491 (reporting stalled surprise 
billing efforts and attack ads). Price transparency is argued to be an important aspect of 
consumer choice in well-functioning markets, but patients are not consumers and health care 
is far from being a functioning market. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the 
Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963) (class articulation of reasons 
that health care is not a market and can never be). 
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administrative complexity.237 Adding to high cost complaints is the 
fact that a quarter of large employers offer only high-deductible health 
insurance to their employees, indicating that even those who obtain 
ESI are paying high premiums and must have substantial personal 
savings to pay medical costs.238 Further, low to middle-income families 
struggle to obtain, keep, and use ESI, which is unavailable to most low-
income households.239  
In short, the conversation repeatedly returns to cost, and it should 
not be surprising, with stories such as parents waiting in hospital 
parking lots to see if a child’s illness is a life-threatening emergency or 
a passing event.240 Those proposing health reform have noticed, and 
single-payer proposals appear to assume, that a new public finance 
mechanism would negotiate payments in the same way that Medicare 
creates reimbursement algorithms. Eradicating out-of-pocket costs like 
copayments and deductibles, as some bills do, would address one part 
of the cost problem, but high prices are everywhere.241 
 
 237  William H. Shrank, Teresa L. Rogstad & Natasha Parekh, Waste in the US Health Care System, 
233 JAMA 1501, 1504 (2019). 
 238  Shelby Livingston, Fewer employers offering high-deductible plans as only option, MODERN 




53497ES1OrXj9NOF8UjDuqh920gicg87IttUour05H7xkjzJs0g&_hsmi=75680650 (25% down 
from 39% in 2017).  
 239  ESI has been decreasing for the last twenty years and has become nearly unattainable for 
people earning less than 400% of FPL. See, e.g., Matthew Rae, Gary Claxton, Larry Levitt & 
Daniel McDermott, Long-Term Trends in Employer-Based Coverage, PETERSON-KAISER HEALTH 
SYS. TRACKER (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.healthsystem tracker.org /brief/long-term-trends-
in-employer-based-coverage/#item-start. 
 240  See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, “Am I a bad person?” Why one mom didn’t take her kid to the ER — even after 
poison control said to, VOX (May 10, 2019), https://www.vox.com/health-care/2019 
/5/10/18526696/health-care-costs-er-emergency-room. 
 241  See, e.g., Matthew Perrone, Doctors don’t always know what patients will owe for meds, AP NEWS 




_l994iw&_hsmi=76224480 (reporting on studies showing the central role of costs in 
preventing patients from obtaining many kinds of medical care); Himmelstein et al., supra 
note 94. 
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Another problem with the ACA’s plan is the financial aid cutoff at 
400% of the FPL. People at that earning level find ESI is expensive and 
yet earn too much for federal tax credits to purchase insurance on an 
exchange. This may partially drive a sense of legislative inequity that 
provides some support for the Trump administration’s policy 
encouraging work requirements in Medicaid and other conditions that 
appear to make Medicaid look more like private insurance.242 Work 
requirements predictably lead to disenrollment in all social programs, 
and low-income individuals are very unlikely to be able to gain health 
insurance through employment benefits.243 These are the kinds of 
problems that led to the insurance reforms in the ACA and are clearly 
designed to undermine the law, even though the law has become 
popular.244 This disconnect between public opinion and political action 
calls for deeper understanding, because it highlights the ongoing 
pushback against the ACA’s universalism but also the growing 
expectation of universal coverage. 
Turning to the conversation about universal coverage, the U.S. is 
in a unique position among industrialized nations: it is the last nation 
to adopt a universal coverage policy.245 Part of the reason that U.S. 
policy has been different is that the human rights upheaval that swept 
most of Europe after World War II was largely bypassed in the U.S.246 
 
 242  Polls have shown when people learn that most who are able to do so are already working, 
support for work requirements disintegrates. See, e.g., Dylan Scott, America’s Medicaid work 
requirement paradox, explained by 2 polls, VOX (Feb. 5, 2018, 3:50 PM), https://www. 
vox.com/health-care/2018/2/5/16975574/medicaid-work-requirement-paradox-polls 
(exploring the differences in polls regarding work requirements and concluding that people 
polled do not think access to health care should be cut off, especially when they learn that 
most people in social programs who are able to work do so). 
 243  See, e.g., Matthew Rae, Gary Claxton, Larry Levitt & Daniel McDermott, Long-Term Trends in 
Employer-Based Coverage, PETERSON-KAISER HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Jan. 30, 2019), 
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/long-term-trends-in-employer-based-
coverage/#item-start. 
 244  Gluck & Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?, supra note 18, at 1724–25; see also 
Gluck & Huberfeld, Federalism under the ACA, supra note 8. 
 245  See Vice President Biden Remarks, supra note 14. 
 246  See, e.g., David Sloss & Wayne Sandholtz, Universal Human Rights and Constitutional Change, 
27 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1183 (2019) (tracing phases of implementation of human rights 
and theorizing federalization of human rights in the U.S. after World War II despite U.S. 
reticence to ratify and implement human rights treaties); see also Ann Elizabeth Mayer, 
Reflections on the Proposed United States Reservations to CEDAW: Should the Constitution Be an 
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Other nations rewrote constitutions to reflect the principles outlined in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which includes 
an explicit right to health; the U.S. Constitution remained unchanged. 
The United States has not signed, or has signed but not ratified, key 
treaties implementing aspects of the UDHR, such as the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which explicates 
the right to health.247 Human rights experts argue that the Constitution 
has become an excuse that keeps the U.S. from implementing human 
rights principles within its own borders, even as it has promoted 
universal human rights abroad.248  
For example, the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 
illuminate the longstanding, historical disagreement over health as a 
human right versus health as a private good. Medicare desegregated 
hospitals through the tool of federal spending power, but Medicaid 
baked “states rights” into the health policy cake. This federalism 
structure was a contradiction in the new federal law, which was 
designed with core statutory protections for poor people on one hand 
but allowed states to continue policy control over medical care for their 
poor populations through state flexibilities (exercised through 
“options” in Medicaid) and other policymaking tools left to states.249 If 
Medicaid did not contain specific federal statutory requirements, some 
states would not have provided the new public insurance to non-white 
residents.250  
 
Obstacle to Human Rights, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 727, 741–54 (1996) (describing American 
constitutional exceptionalism and its role in the history of rejecting human rights treaties). 
 247  International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights art. 3, Dec. 19, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 83 (1967), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/ 
Chapter%20IV/IV-3.en.pdf 
 248  See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 242. Ruth Macklin accuses the US of violating human rights as a 
wealthy nation that chooses not to provide a health care system that affords reasonable access 
to medical care for all residents. RUTH MACKLIN, AGAINST RELATIVISM: CULTURAL DIVERSITY 
AND THE SEARCH FOR ETHICAL UNIVERSALS IN MEDICINE 245 (Oxford U. Press ed., 1999). 
 249  STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 56. 
 250  One powerful example is the EPSDT requirement, a very specific set of benefits for children 
enrolled in Medicaid, which exists because the state Medicaid administrators in Southern 
states have bluntly said that without this obligation, non-white children would never be 
appropriately examined by the mostly white doctors. See Sara Rosenbaum email to Nicole 
Huberfeld, cited in Gluck & Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?, supra note 18, at 
n.82 (email on file with author). 
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The Medicaid expansion experience thus far has echoed the 
history of the program, with some states implementing and improving 
on the federal rules (for example by expanding Medicaid beyond the 
ACA) and others seeking to test the baseline of the law.251 It is not a 
surprise that states like Texas, Mississippi, and Alabama still have not 
expanded eligibility, because they have long resisted federal health 
policies designed to improve access to care for the poor. These states 
are missing a crucial tool for addressing the coronavirus pandemic, as 
non-elderly adults earning below 100% of the FPL have no insurance 
options in expansion holdout states, yet many residents are suffering 
from the double disaster of coronavirus and the economic downturn 
triggered by the pandemic. The novel coronavirus outbreak starkly 
illuminated the deeply entrenched disparities experienced by Black, 
indigenous, and people of color in these states, including much higher 
infection and death rates from COVID-19. While the racial differences 
in infection and mortality from COVID-19 exist nationwide, they are 
especially steep in states that have resisted the ACA’s principle of 
universality.252 
Failed health reform efforts are bound to be repeated if lessons for 
what works and why are not learned. For example, if federalism 
invites irregularity into a program designed to create a national 
baseline, why is federalism still a default approach in health reform? 
Abbe Gluck and I have concluded in other work that federalism serves 
purposes such as political expediency and state sovereignty, but it is 
not at all clear that a federalism structure serves health policy goals 
such as equitability or administrative simplicity. Congress built 
 
 251  Gluck & Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?, supra note 18. 
 252  See, e.g., Jesse Baumgartner et al., How the Affordable Care Act Has Narrowed Racial and Ethnic 
Disparities in Access to Health Care, Commonwealth Fund (Jan. 16, 2020), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/2020/jan/how-ACA-narrowed-racial-
ethnic-disparities-access; Eboni G. Price-Haywood et al., Hospitalization and Mortality among 
Black Patients and White Patients with Covid-19, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2534 (2020), 
https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMsa2011686?articleTools=true. This study found 
“In a large cohort in Louisiana, 76.9% of the patients who were hospitalized with Covid-19 
and 70.6% of those who died were black, whereas blacks comprise only 31% of the Ochsner 
Health population.” Id. at 2534. Louisiana was late to Medicaid expansion, starting in 2016 
rather than 2014 after an election ousted an anti-ACA governor. See also Monica Webb Hooper 
et al., COVID-19 and Racial/Ethnic Disparities, 323 JAMA 2466 (2020) (data about race-based 
disparities in COVID infection rates, symptoms, and deaths).  
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federalism into the key features of the ACA, and now we can say that 
as implemented, federalism has both undermined and facilitated the 
law’s goal of universal coverage. But we see now that the federalism 
structure of Medicaid is worsening access to care during a pandemic. 
The pandemic also spotlights problems with the decentralized, 
federalism-based structure of public health for data gathering, risk 
reduction, and for achieving at least minimal baselines in health care 
and health outcomes.253 While some of the bills before Congress would 
reduce the role of states in health policymaking, many rely on what 
exists now, with the addition of a public option to fill the coverage gap. 
We should question whether continued construction of scaffolding 
around an old foundation that fails many thousands of people, and the 
same populations repeatedly, is the right path forward. 
CONCLUSION 
It appears the ACA roused a sleeping giant of a conversation, a 
one hundred year old debate over universal coverage. The ACA 
attempted to fix a major problem with health care  ̶ lack of access due 
to widespread inability to pay  ̶ through creating near-universal health 
insurance coverage. The law addressed other issues, such as funding 
public health and improving it through measures such as free 
preventive care and menu labeling; new kinds of payment in Medicare 
and Medicaid, such as accountable care organizations; and many other 
smaller solutions to problematic features of the health care landscape. 
But, in 2009, the big game was universal coverage through insurance 
reform.  
Economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton created a stir when they 
described the cost of health care as a “poll tax” because the cost is so 
high that it is effectively a tax that all U.S. residents pay.254 This 
 
 253  See generally Nicole Huberfeld, Sarah H. Gordon, David K. Jones, Federalism Complicates the 
Response to the COVID-19 Health and Economic Crisis: What Can Be Done?, 45 J. HEALTH POL., 
POL’Y & L. 951 (2020). 
 254  Heather Long, Every American family basically pays an $8,000 ‘poll tax’ under the U.S. health 
system, top economists say, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/business/2020/01/07/every-american-family-basically-pays-an-poll-tax-under-us-
health-system-top-economists-say/. “Despite paying $8,000 more a year than anyone else, 
American families do not have better health outcomes, the economists argue. Life expectancy 
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unusual descriptor points to the same issue: many Americans cannot 
afford the care they need, which is brought into sharper relief by the 
amount of money paid both individually and collectively ($11,072 per 
person in 2018).255 The ACA did not take a hard look at the cost of care. 
The gestalt reflects frustration with policy leaders’ unwillingness to 
scrutinize the reasons that care is so expensive, especially given 
ongoing access issues, and relative to other developed nations’ cost of 
care and measures of health. The U.S. has the dubious distinction of 
paying the most but being the least healthy among wealthy nations.256 
A related question is whether the U.S. will follow global norms 
and treat health (not just health care) as a human right with the serious 
legislative effort that would entail.257 The presidential primary debates 
suggested the answer could be affirmative, but pronouncements 
surrounding the signing of the ACA started the buzz that America was 
treating health as the next civil right, which means that it has taken ten 
years for the public to begin to embrace this principle. Recognizing 
health as a human right does not necessitate only government action 
or exclusion of private entities, and models exist in other nations that 
 
in the United States is lower than in Europe. ‘We can brag we have the most expensive health 
care. We can also now brag that it delivers the worst health of any rich country,’ Case said.” 
Id. Case and Deaton are known for their work on so-called diseases and deaths of despair. 
See, e.g., Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Rising morbidity and mortality in midlife among white non-
Hispanic Americans in the 21st century, 112 PROC.  NAT’L ACAD. SCI., 15078 (2015) (identifying 
“deaths of despair” by documenting increasing mortality for middle-aged, white Americans 
and linking the trend to an “epidemic of pain, suicide, and drug overdoses”); Anne Case & 
Angus Deaton, Mortality & Morbidity in the 21st Century,  BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. 
ACTIVITY, Spring 2017, at 397, 398 (amending and updating their 2015 work).  
 255  Rabah Kamal, et al., How has U.S. spending on healthcare changed over time?, PETERSON-KAISER 
FAM. FOUND. HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.healthsystemtracker 
.org/chart-collection/u-s-spending-healthcare-changed-time/#item-nhe-trends_total-
national-health-expenditures-us-per-capita-1970-2018. 
 256  Gerard F. Anderson, Peter Hussey & Varduhi Petrosyan, It’s Still the Prices Stupid: Why the 
US Spends So Much on Health Care, And a Tribute to Uwe Reinhardt, 38 HEALTH AFFS. 87 (2019), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi /10.1377/hlthaff.2018.05144; OECD Health Statistics 2019, 
ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,https://www.oecd .org/health/health-data.htm (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2020). 
 257  The human rights phrase is “framework legislation.” See General Comment No. 14, The right to 
the highest attainable standard of health (article 12), Part IV, Committee on Economic, Social and 
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have demonstrated through regulated private markets that private 
players can participate well in a universal coverage scheme.258 But 
America has progressed in an almost backwards fashion from these 
other nations, allowing private markets to develop to the point of 
requiring governmental intervention to function, whereas other 
nations have operated from a baseline of inclusion for decades. 
Single-payer health insurance is easily a constitutional exercise of 
Congress’s spending power, as would be a public insurance plan sold 
through the exchanges to fill coverage gaps. But, retaining divided 
governance (federalism) and other difficult debates that affect 
powerful stakeholders, such as methods and rates of payment or 
outlawing private insurance, raise harder constitutional questions. 
Nevertheless, the bottom line is that the legal questions are more 
straightforward than the policy and political questions. It appears that 
patience has worn thin on distracting political hurdles, especially in 
light of the persistent health disparities so painfully on display during 
the novel coronavirus pandemic. Administrative complexity, inequity, 
and high prices have been building this crescendo for quite a while. 
 
 
 258  Roosa Tikkanen, Variations on a Theme: A Look at Universal Health Coverage in Eight Countries, 
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.commonwealthfund.org /blog/2019/ 
universal-health-coverage-eight-countries; Gerard F. Anderson, et al., Reevaluating ‘Made in 
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(comparing cost controls in Germany and Japan to US). + 
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